

The Influence of US Military Technologists in the Course of the Large-Scale War between Russia and Ukraine

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Abstract

The research paper is devoted to the change of US foreign policy goals and implementation methods about both Russia and Ukraine in the conditions of the largest scale and bloodiest military conflict in Europe since the 2nd World War. In the paper, the priorities of the military aid selected by the US to Ukraine during the war and the impact of the military assistance provided during the war are analyzed.

It discusses in detail the relations between the USA and Ukraine, primarily from a military perspective, from the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Also, the paper presents the change in the US military strategy from the end of the Cold War to the present day and, accordingly, the military-technical progress of the US based on the existing challenges. On February 24, 2022, after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the US provided a fairly substantial part of the American high-tech weapons necessary for a conventional war to Ukraine, which had a significant impact on the course of the war in favor of Ukraine.

Keywords: Ukraine, USA, Military Operations, War, technologies

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Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, international relations under the sole hegemony of the USA underwent significant changes over time. Despite the efforts to establish a global policy based on a liberal cornerstone and democracy, many regional hegemony had emerged in the world, with political leadership dependent on authoritarianism and methods driven by political realism to spread influence in the international arena, which had led to the establishment of a multipolar system, where regional hegemony, still using force, try to spread their interests as in the internal politics of the state, as well as its location in the regional space, as a result of which the possibilities of saving the sovereignty of small and weak states were drastically shaken, and in the conditions when the vector of the political life of Western states remained in the democratic and liberal prism, with a society adapted to peaceful life and less than the undemocratic side of international politics with engagement.

It was the tolerant policy of non-provocation chosen by the West that opened the door to the rise of the Russian Federation, the legal successor of Soviet Kashira, which, despite the military aggression carried out in Georgia in 2008 and then in Ukraine in 2014, failed to receive an effective response and deterrent from the Western democratic world, due to which, Russia's imperially-minded president, Vladimir Putin, has practically launched an attempt to restore Soviet Kashir, renewed in the name of the Russian world and using elements of hybrid warfare, which did not find favor with the growth of Russian influence in the neighboring post-Soviet states, and it was necessary to start with a hard way of implementing the plan. Therefore, on February 24, 2022, Russia began unprovoked large-scale military actions against Ukraine, invading the territory of Ukraine from many directions and with the declared military-political goals of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. The start of a large-scale and unprovoked war by Russia with a neighboring state turned out to be the reason for

the reactivation of the Western world under the leadership of the USA in the international arena, which led to Ukraine's unconditional political-economic and, most importantly, military support, which made it possible to contain the Russian large-scale attack at the initial stage and with subsequent counter-attacks. Liberation of part of the occupied territories.

Accordingly, the strategic goals declared by Russia at the beginning of the war turned out to be unfulfilled, to which the military-technical assistance provided by the USA to Ukraine made the greatest contribution, which will be studied in the main part of the paper.

The main research questions of the study:

1. About Ukraine, what were the main goals and interests of the US foreign policy before and during the current war between Russia and Ukraine?
2. How did the US military strategy and military-technical development change in the period after the end of the Cold War, and at what pace was the supply of the mentioned military-technical resources to Ukraine?
3. After the start of a large-scale military conflict by Ukraine, how was the use of US military-technical assistance in different phases of the war and how much did it influence the course of the war?

Research subject:

- The main priorities of US military-technical assistance for Ukraine.
- Dynamics of large-scale war between Russia and Ukraine.
- Analysis of the effectiveness of targeting and use of military-technical assistance by the US to Ukraine.
- The impact of the provided military assistance in different phases of the ongoing war, at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Methods:

While working on the paper, for an in-depth analysis of the research topic and a thorough study of the issue, several scientific articles, works, documents, a wide range of literary material, and opinions recorded by specialists in the field were used.

To carry out the research effectively, several types of methods were used, namely:

The method of historical analysis - was used to discuss several issues raised in the paper through a historical prism, including analyzing the development of US-Ukraine relations from a historical perspective and conveying the existing differences.

Comparative analysis method - using this method, we were able to compare US-Ukraine relations before and after the war, as well as show the difference between the armed forces of Ukraine equipped with US military technologies and the Russian army.

The content analysis made it possible to better present the various types of aid provided by the USA to Ukraine over the years and, in general, in the post-Soviet space, to analyze the US foreign policy conducted on the example of Ukraine, for which official statements, agreements, articles or other types of documentary materials were used.

Through the use of the descriptive method, we first analyzed the foreign policy pursued by the USA towards Ukraine over the years, and based on it, we were able to determine the quantitative and qualitative nature of the US military-technical assistance, and at the same time, we presented the situation at the front in different phases of the war.

A quantitative method of research is used in the paper, which made it possible to understand public attitudes regarding the issue of US military assistance to Ukraine.

In addition, to get to know the issues in the research in depth and to determine some differences or common facts between them, the method of comparative analysis was used.

The methodology used during research development and Theoretical framework:

The research work carried out related to and used various research methodologies and theories, including:

The theory of "political realism", according to which states in international relations still act based on their interests and use force to increase their influence, at the same time largely ignores the practical and effective role of international organizations in interstate cooperation and tries to develop their power at an accelerated pace, which is often sacrificed by small and the interests of weak states.

The "balance of power" theory is known as the concept of an anarchic arrangement of the international system, where states act in an anarchic environment for self-preservation and preservation of sovereignty, and to achieve this, it is often used to unite with other states through military-political ties and act within the framework of a single plan against the enemy.

The theory of "hybrid war" implies such an understanding of the conflicts in the 21st century, where states, in confrontation and to achieve their strategic goals, use not only rigid military methods but multi-component war is waged in a political, economic, and socio-cultural prism.

The theory of "cooperative security" is the ideal implementation of the theoretical understanding of cooperation in the security sector of states in practice, which combines four main models, namely: individual security, collective defense, collective security, and achieving stability.

The theory of "complex interdependence" includes an understanding of the relations between states that is sharply different from political realism, where states act in relation, not only to the vector of national security but also include many other components, both governmental and transnational issues, for example, trade, industrial development, communications, etc.

After the end of the Cold War, a general overview of US foreign policy in the post-Soviet space and actions on the example of Ukraine

After the end of the 2nd World War, the end of the "Cold War" produced as a result of the iron curtain between the Western and Soviet political space and the unconditional victory of the political civilization of the Western democracy under the leadership of the USA, created an important springboard from the last decade of the 20th century for the US- s, towards the 15 independent states formed in the post-Soviet space, taking into account their national interests, to carry out "soft" and "smart" supporting actions of democratic processes, most importantly in the role of the only existing hegemon state in the world.

US interests in different countries of the post-Soviet space were different and were based on significant military, political, or economic advantages in specific countries. Accordingly, the direct and indirect intervention of the USA in the internal politics of the mentioned countries was well analyzed, planned, and executed.

In particular, the USA, in the 1990s, launched an important humanitarian aid campaign to help 15 newly independent states emerging in the post-Soviet space, which spent hundreds of millions of dollars and focused on the US as a peacemaker in society, acting with democratic intentions. In presenting the role of a strong supporting state.

Ukraine was one of the recipients of expensive humanitarian aid provided by the USA, which, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, remained an independent state with the greatest military-technical and economic potential after Russia, on the road to democracy, which was in critical need of the unhealthy internal political processes within the country. Stabilization and choosing the right foreign policy course.

US-Ukraine military relations after the end of the Cold War

In the conditions of political realism, in the conduct of international relations, the states still actively act in consideration of their national interests and often use hard power to achieve it, for the survival of any independent state, especially for the existence of small and weak states, it is necessary to conduct correct diplomacy, as well as the state The increase in defense capability, which, of course, is primarily expressed in the country's military potential.

After the collapse of the Soviet Kashir, the states that remained in its ruins, based on the agreement, distributed both the conventional Soviet military arsenal and nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, it was nuclear weapons that became the starting point of the US-Ukraine military cooperation, since and because, as a result of the collapse of Soviet Kashir, Ukraine received the right to dispose of 1,800 different types of nuclear warheads on its territory, thus Ukraine became the country with the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world (Brookings, 2011).

On January 8, 1994, US President Bill Clinton sent the US Secretary of Defense a memorandum on the need for assistance to the post-Soviet region, including Ukraine. The memorandum provided for the active assistance of the post-Soviet states to achieve the security of the US and the world. On January 12 of the same year, Clinton announced during his visit to Kyiv that the US, Ukraine, and Russia were ready to sign the agreement on the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, and in return, Ukraine would receive economic and security guarantees from the US (NATO, 2021). At the same time, the US invited Ukraine to participate in the NATO Partnership for Peace program.

Taking into account the pre-problem of receiving security and financial guarantees, the President of Ukraine officially confirmed the necessity

of nuclear disarmament and expressed readiness to sign the agreement.

As early as 1994, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the START I treaty. At the same time, on April 4, the "Budapest Memorandum" was signed in Budapest, the capital of Hungary, whereby in exchange for the destruction of nuclear weapons for Ukraine, the USA, Russia, and Britain provided security guarantees under the treaty (NTI, 2024).

Giving up nuclear weapons has several advantages for Ukraine in the way of rapprochement with Western structures.

US-Ukraine military-political cooperation was immediately activated, both directly between the two countries and within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, which Ukraine joined on February 8, 1994. As part of the program, Ukrainian Armed Forces units participated in P.F.P multinational exercises, which were followed by joint US-Ukraine naval and military exercises in 1995 and 1996. Moreover, in the fall of 1996, the United States provided \$10 million to participants in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, allowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces to fully participate in the program at minimal cost to the Ukrainian national budget. In the same period, Ukraine officially declared integration into the Euro-Atlantic organizations as a strategic goal of its foreign policy, and in 1997 officially requested NATO expansion. At the 1997 Madrid Summit, the USA responded to Ukraine's request with its partners by deciding to start a special partnership with Ukraine (European Security After NATO's Madrid Summit, 2022).

In November 1998, in parallel with the development of the official strategy of rapprochement with the European Union, Ukraine adopted a comprehensive three-year program for deepening cooperation with NATO.

Despite the sharp determination of the foreign policy course, the political chaos in Ukraine at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the corruption in the country, the bias and

indolence of the judicial authorities greatly hindered the procedures of Ukraine's rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic space, which was reflected not only in the political but also in the military sense. The situation in the domestic political field of Ukraine was accompanied by the strengthening of terrorism on a global scale and the switch of the main vector of US foreign policy and security interests to the fight against terrorism. It is for these reasons that US-Ukraine cooperation in military security issues has weakened dramatically.

On the other hand, Vladimir Putin was elected as the President of Russia, who aimed to strengthen Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space, both by using elements of hybrid warfare and by direct involvement of hard power.

After the "Orange" revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the US-Ukraine cooperation in defense and security issues is deepening, which is limited mainly to training programs and supporting reforms necessary for the structural maintenance of the armed forces.

During this period, Ukraine actively participated in various peace operations under the auspices of the United Nations and NATO and tried as much as possible to get closer to the Euro-Atlantic organizations through effective internal reforms.

In August 2008, after the large-scale military attack carried out by Russia in Georgia, Russia set its geopolitical ambitions into practice, the achievement of which began by occupying the territories of Georgia, one of the fundamental reformer states of the developing democracy, from its regional zone, although there was no appropriate response from the West to Russia's aggressive military actions.

Moreover, in 2009, the administration of US President Barack Obama launched a "reset" policy with Russia, which ended in a complete collapse as a result of the processes that took place in Ukraine in 2013-2014.

The year 2014 is considered to be a new benchmark in US-Ukraine military cooperation.

Russia's annexation of Crimea and occupation of a part of Donbas created serious threats to the European security architecture, therefore there was a need to restrain Russia, on which the sanctions imposed in the first decade of the 2000s, which led to a deep rapprochement with Europe in the energy field, did not have an effective and deterrent function.

Since 2014, the USA has started active military cooperation with Ukraine. In April 2015, the first Ukrainian-American joint exercises took place, with the participation of soldiers of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade. Within the framework of the mentioned program, the American side retrained about 900 officers of the National Guard of Ukraine, special operations forces, and other Ukrainian units. In addition, in May 2015, as part of the annual Platinum Eagle military exercise, the Ukrainian military improved its military skills in destroying enemy aircraft and operating with different types of armored combat vehicles (dvidshub.net, 2015). In the same year, the US began helping Ukraine in the Donbas region to clear mines and unexploded ordnance, for which the United States allocated more than 77.3 million dollars.

Between 2015 and 2020, the United States also authorized the continued export of defense products and services worth more than \$274 million to Ukraine through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). The most demanded categories of Ukraine's DCS exports during the mentioned period were: munitions (\$88 million), fire control systems, laser rangefinders, vision, and control equipment, (\$69 million), and the last category: military electronics (\$22 million).

Since the second half of 2017, the US State Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation has allocated more than \$34.8 million to support Ukraine's nonproliferation, counterterrorism, demining, and security programs. The assistance also touched on the necessary mechanisms for the security of land and sea borders.

From September 8 to 23, 2017, more than 2,500 Ukrainian soldiers participated in the NATO-

sponsored multinational exercise Rapid Trident 2017 (Kyivpost, 2017).

Despite active US-Ukraine military cooperation, the US still refrained from supplying Ukraine with lethal military weapons, which changed in 2018. After the arrival of Donald Trump's administration in the USA, in 2018, the USA allocated funds for the first time in history to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine, within the framework of which Ukraine received 210 units of FGM JAVELIN-type anti-tank missiles from the USA in 2018 to strengthen its anti-armor and anti-tank capabilities. (anti-tank guided missile), and then, in 2019, an additional 150 units. Already in 2020, Ukraine received Mark VI patrol boats from the US to develop its maritime patrol capabilities (Seapowermagazine, 2021).

In 2021, a joint statement by President Volodymyr Zelensky and Joe Biden testified that US-Ukraine relations had reached an all-time high, especially in the defense field (Washington Post, 2021).

Since 2021, the program of training and equipping Ukrainian units by Western standards has been intensively continued, within the framework of which thousands of Ukrainian soldiers received the highest military training to deter potential Russian aggression.

From the second half of 2021, in the background of large-scale exercises and subsequent mobilization by Russia near the borders of Ukraine, accompanied by ultimatums issued by the Russian government to Ukraine and the West, the USA began to invest even more in the security of Ukraine. In particular, the rate of assistance to Ukraine with lethal military weapons, which were supplied to Ukraine from US Department of Defense stockpiles, increased. Before the arrival of February 24, 2022, the USA thoroughly studied and investigated the air defense and anti-armor capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Military aid was provided to Ukraine, both directly and through the use of partner countries.

Along with military-technical assistance, the US actively began providing and sharing intelligence information with Ukraine (Politico, 2021).

From February 24, 2022, a completely new and large-scale era of military cooperation between Ukraine and the United States began, within the framework of which Ukraine has received \$35.1 billion worth of military-technical assistance from the United States.

During the Russia-Ukraine large-scale war, the impact of military-technical assistance provided by the US to Ukraine in different phases of the war

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine large-scale war, based on the situation and needs on the front, the US has been setting certain priorities, taking into account the delivery of military-technical assistance to Ukraine.

In the large-scale war that began on February 24, 2022, we have so far identified 3 main phases of the process, taking into account the fact that the US has set priorities for the provision of arms and other types of military assistance to Ukraine, both directly to the American side and to its allies worldwide, and these phases are as follows:

Phase I - Deterrence Strategy of Ukrainian Armed Forces and Battle for Kyiv

Phase II - attempt to capture Donbas by the Russian armed forces

Phase III - Ukrainians gaining the operational initiative on the front and counter-attacks of Kharkiv and Kherson.

The goal is to present in detail in the following subsections the priorities of US military-technical assistance according to the phases of the war and their influence in favor of Ukraine in the course of the war, which, along with other existing reasons, significantly led to the strategic brilliance announced by the Russian military-political elite at the beginning of the war - the

demilitarization of Ukraine. The complete collapse of denazification and its strategic failure.

The first phase of the war - the strategy of containment of the armed forces of Ukraine and the fight for Kyiv

The large-scale war waged by Russia against Ukraine was based on the blitzkrieg strategy, the goal of which was, after the accumulation of large forces near the borders of Ukraine, in parallel with massive air, missile, and artillery operations, to launch an invasion of the territory of Ukraine using a ground component from several directions, and with combat operations designed for a few days of campaign, Achieving a complete military defeat of Ukraine.

To achieve this, Russia deployed approximately 70% of the active combat units of the Russian Armed Forces along the borders of Ukraine in 4 main directions: from the north - Kyiv, from the northeast - Chernihiv-Sumy, from the east - Kharkiv-Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk) and from the south - Kherson-Zaporozhie regions. , which consisted of 200-250,000 servicemen of the Russian Ground Forces, Airborne Forces, and National Guard, who were tasked with conducting maneuver warfare on the territory of Ukraine with high mobility, quickly capturing and controlling territories, and disabling large groups of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from combat, their by destruction or siege.

On the night and morning of February 24, after a massive air-missile-artillery attack, Russian military units began to invade the territory of Ukraine from the following 4 directions:

Northern Front - the 29th, 35th, and 36th Armies of the Eastern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces and units of the 76th Airborne Combat Division of the Russian Federation launched an attack from Belarus in the direction of the Kyiv region and the capital city of Kyiv.

Northeastern Front - with the participation of the 41st General Army of the Central Military District of the Russian Armed Forces and the 2nd Guards General Army, an attack on the Sumy and Chernihiv regions in the north-east of Ukraine was launched from the territory of Russia, from the border regions of Kursk and Bryansk.

Eastern front - with the participation of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western Military District of the Russian Armed Forces, the 20th and 6th General Public Armies, from the territory of the Belgorod region belonging to Russia and the territory of the Donbas region occupied after 2014, the offensive of the Kharkiv and Donetsk-Luhansk regions began. to the depths.

Southern Front - With the participation of the 58th Army of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces, the 49th and 8th General Military Armies, the 7th Airborne Combat Division, and the 11th Airborne Combat Brigade, an offensive was launched to capture the Kherson region from the annexed Crimea. - through Odesa, and the Zaporizhzhia region to the city of Mariupol and the operational headquarters of the Zaporizhzhia region (CSIS, 2021).

Considering Russia's large-scale and multi-component combined ground attack, the main objective of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was to act with a deterrence strategy, taking into account the extensive operational spaces in the contact zones and unfavorable climatic conditions for the attack, so that the Russian combat forces could not blitzkrieg large urban settlements, mainly regional centers to take over and at the same time to implement effective mobile and active defense, both to maintain large Ukrainian military groups, and to neutralize Russian military convoys stretching hundreds of kilometers in the rear and restrain the enemy's ground attack "fist".

To achieve this, it was necessary to protect the capital of Ukraine to prevent the realization of Russia's primary strategic goal, which was to capture the capital Kyiv, and destroy or topple the military-political leadership located there.

And, in the second place, the interruption of the battalion tactical groups of the Russian combat ground forces operating with high mobility on the operational directions of the common front and preventing the dominance of the Russian Air Force in the sky of Ukraine, so that another strategic goal of Russia, which consisted in the destruction of the Ukrainian armed forces or their combat, could not be realized. To neutralize the use.

Taking into account the strategy of protection and containment of the capital, in the first phase of the war, the US began to prioritize the provision of military-technical assistance to Ukraine, which included several directions:

First of all, the transfer of accurate and effective intelligence information to Ukraine, both about the actions of Russian aviation, and about the directions of the attack of the ground component and their placement in qualitative and quantitative terms, for which the US and NATO reconnaissance planes flying near the borders of Ukraine were used, and with them, US military infrared and standard imaging satellites under NATO control.

In addition to providing intelligence, to effectively implement the deterrence strategy in practice, the main Russian ground strike force invading Ukraine, considering the massively maneuverable battalion tactical groups of highly-maneuverable armored personnel carriers and mobile artillery, the US will strengthen armor and anti-tank capabilities for Ukraine, as well as ensure the accuracy of counter-artillery fire and To use them with high mobility, the supply of modern man-portable guided and unguided weapons systems and tactical-level counter-battery radar stations to Ukraine, namely FIM-148 JAVELIN-type guided anti-tank missile systems, 60-82 mm mortars, various types of high-efficiency grenade launchers and AT/TPQ-36 type counter-battery radars.

At the same time, several months before the start of the war, based on the research carried out by the US air defense specialists in the Ukrainian Airborne Forces, the conclusions were drawn, according to

which the Ukrainian Armed Forces had sufficient medium and long-range stationary and mobile air defense systems and their ammunition for the initial stage. , to disrupt the high-altitude operations of the Russian tactical military aviation, although it suffered from a serious deficiency in terms of effective low-altitude anti-aircraft missile systems. Taking into account the above situation, to prevent Russian tactical military aviation from operating at low altitudes, both fighter jets and multi-purpose attack helicopters from dominating the sky of Ukraine, the USA started for Ukraine, as well as for use with high mobility FIM-92 STINGER type hand-portable anti-aircraft missile systems and tactical level Delivering large numbers of towed radar stations (Defensenews, 2022).

Deterrence strategy priorities also included high-mobility HUMVVE-type light armored vehicles, modern HARRIS-type secure communication radios, tactical-level reconnaissance drones, large quantities of personal equipment, and the necessary ammunition.

With the received military-technical assistance, the armed forces of Ukraine were able to carry out effective deterrence, in particular, Ukrainian units, using accurate intelligence information and weapon systems provided by the US, determined the attack directions of the combatant Russian units, after which they began with mobile self-defense groups and territorial defense reserves, in the operational spaces of the territory of Ukraine. Using civilian highways, operating in the rear of Russian forces invading in a wedge, which included the production of accurate artillery/counter-artillery fire in the direction of their concentration areas and attacks on extended military convoys, including logistics and engineering units, with hand-held anti-tank and anti-armor missile systems, for which high efficiency Guided anti-tank systems, light mortars, counter-battery radars, reconnaissance drones, and mobile armored vehicles needed for rapid movement were used.

FIM-92 STINGER-type hand-held anti-aircraft missile systems and short-range radar stations, through which mobile Ukrainian anti-aircraft

calculations, did not allow the Russian tactical air force to enter Ukraine's airspace, played a major role in deterring the Russian ground combat component. Predominance at low altitude, thus enabling effective air support of the tactical groups of the Russian battalion invading the territory of Ukraine, is of the utmost importance for conducting maneuver warfare with the blitzkrieg strategy in the conditions of modern warfare.

Using accurate intelligence information, according to the deterrence strategy, along with active defense, which takes into account sabotage and guerrilla actions in the enemy's rear, the Ukrainians could maneuver large combat groups and move in the operational spaces in such a way that the fighting Russian forces could not, in any direction of the front, the large Ukrainian armed forces Encircling the group and either capturing or destroying them would cause significant psychological and practical damage to Ukraine's military capabilities.

Although at the initial stage, the Russian forces on the southern front were able to make a rapid advance and encircle the Ukrainian military group consisting of about 3-4000 fighters in the city of Mariupol, the procedures for capturing the city and neutralizing the Ukrainian combat group locked in the city took so long and cost the Russian armed forces so much. , that the battle for Mariupol turned into a big crash for the Russian military-political leadership instead of a success. In contrast to the Ukrainian side, who, first of all, with their selfless struggle to defend the city, strengthened the fighting morale and desire to resist in the Ukrainian society and the armed forces, at the same time, by tying a large number of Russian units to Mariupol, they gave the Ukrainian military group stationed in the Donetsk region a few months to prepare to meet after the fall of Mariupol, Donetsk Looking at the Russian units attacking the depths of the region, and most importantly, watching the heroic defenders of Mariupol, the Western society agreed that it was necessary to provide a large amount of military-

technical assistance to Ukraine (Understanding War, 2021).

According to the intelligence information provided by the US and the use of weapons, the armed forces of Ukraine operating with a deterrence strategy in the first phase of the war were able to weaken the ground strike fist of the Russian combat forces that invaded the depths of the Ukrainian territory after the initial breakthrough, did not allow the enemy aviation to dominate the sky and maintain the main regional centers in Kharkiv. With the effective defense of the capital in Chernihiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and most importantly in the Kyiv region, which lasted 1 month, 1 week, and 1 day from February 25 to April 2, 2022, and ended with the complete victory of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The units of the Russian armed forces, operating with the blitzkrieg strategy, could not penetrate Kyiv, nor besiege the city, and the battle continued in the conditions of the trenches, which was complicated, first of all, by the continuous work of the Ukrainian mobile groups operating in the rear and from the flanks to solve Russian supply lines, to destroy logistics, and at the same time, Against the background of heavy losses on the Russian side, the absence of effective combat reserves, due to which the Ministry of Defense of Russia was forced to retreat from the northern and northeastern regions of Ukraine, including as a "gesture of goodwill" it left the northern approaches to Motherland Kyiv, which was nothing but a war Admitting failure in the first phase.

The second phase of the war - an attempt by the Russian armed forces to fully occupy the Donbas region

The complete military defeat of Kyiv and the withdrawal from the northern and northeastern regions of Ukraine as a "goodwill gesture" significantly undermined the image of Russian strength, both internationally and in the eyes of the Russian public.

To restore the aforementioned tarnished image, at the beginning of April 2022, the Ministry of Defense of Russia announced the start of the second phase of the so-called special military operation, the aim of which was to fully occupy the Donbas region, respectively the Donetsk, and Lugansk regions within the administrative borders. Later, the commander of Russia's Central Military District, General Rustav Minekaev, stated that the new military objective of the second phase of the ongoing military operation in Ukraine was to fully occupy the Donbas region, ensure a land connection with Crimea, and create a land corridor by capturing the Odesa region to the separatist Transnistria region of Moldova.

Along with the official announcement, on April 9, by order of Vladimir Putin, the commander of the ongoing Russian military campaign on the territory of Ukraine was changed to General Alexander Dvornikov, the commander of the Southern Military District, known for bombing and razing cities full of civilians in Syria. At the same time, troops withdrawn from the northern regions of Ukraine began to accumulate in the already occupied areas of Donbas and place them on the lines of contact (Foreign Policy, 2022).

It was clear that Russia's new military goal meant the occupation of the Donbas region, and since the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are distinguished by the abundance and density of populated areas, and at the same time, the ongoing combat operations on the existing front since 2014, which turned the front into a territory fortified with multi-layered defensive fences, under such conditions, Russia The armed forces needed a commander in the operational area who was experienced in the destruction and capture of settlements and fortifications.

On the other hand, Russia had about 10 times more firepower compared to the Ukrainian side, especially in terms of artillery and aviation combat equipment and ammunition, which made it even more difficult for the Ukrainians to maintain the existing defensive lines on a front of about 400 km.

Based on this situation, the USA set a new priority for supplying Ukraine with weapons, which meant the supply of artillery military equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, as well as the purchase and transfer to Ukraine of Western-caliber weapons systems and ammunition, as well as Soviet-caliber artillery systems and ammunition available in partner countries. to make it more or less convenient to bring the firing capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces closer to the Russian ones in Donbas.

The first swallow was again the US, which delivered the first batch of over 100 155mm M777 towed artillery pieces to Ukraine in late March and early April, along with the M982 EXCALIBUR GPS-guided 40 km artillery. Projectiles, using which the armed forces of Ukraine had the opportunity to destroy Russian positions and high-value military equipment in the tactical depths of the front, at the same time, the M982 is compatible with other 155 mm artillery installations in the arsenal of NATO countries, which made its use by the Ukrainians even more effective. Condemnation (The Drive, 2022).

From the last third of March to the beginning of April, the Russian Armed Forces had a sort of operational pause on the Eastern Front, within the framework of which troops were gathered in the Donbas region, deployed in combat formations, and mobilized reserves in the rear.

Before the start of the second phase, i.e. the Donbas military campaign, it was a fact that under the existing balance of forces, it would be very difficult for Ukraine to hold the front line and provide equal resistance, therefore it was necessary to use the operational space and the abundance of populated areas in Donbas, with the most correct defensive strategy, the Russian combat capabilities and at the same time receive minimal territorial losses so that the propaganda of the Russian state could not carry out effective propaganda based on tangible success to continue the war and, at the same time, buy time for Ukraine to get the necessary military equipment from

the already established West and use them in the battle.

In contrast to the balance of forces on land, despite the numerically large size of the Russian Air Force, Russia was not able to achieve air supremacy even in the second phase, which is largely due to the Soviet-made air defense systems and fighter aircraft in Ukraine's arsenal, and with them, directly on the front by the US, The large number of man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems transferred to Ukraine has reduced the rates of use of Russian front-line bombers and fighter aircraft to a minimum, coupled with a shortage of precision tactical air-to-ground munitions on the Russian side. The mentioned conditions more or less equalized the use of an effective aviation component on both sides in the combat zones, although Russia still had a quantitative advantage in the sky.

The situation was even more different from the land and air components in the balance of naval forces, where despite the dominance of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and support ships near the Black Sea coast of Ukraine, on April 14, based on US intelligence, units of the Ukrainian Coast Guard launched a long-range Neptun type of national production With an active anti-ship missile system, the Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva was sunk, with the loss of which Russia lost any chance of launching an amphibious assault on Odesa, as the air defense capabilities on board the Moskva allowed Russia to remotely control the entire Black Sea coastline of Ukraine, which it's After the loss, it became impossible, that's why, taking into account the threats coming from Ukraine, the Russian warships and amphibious ships sailing off the coast of Ukraine had to go deep inland, near the coast of Crimea. On the other hand, the armed forces of Ukraine were released from a part of the combat units, in anticipation of the Russian naval landing operation coming from the Black Sea, St. It was deployed to protect Odesa (NBC News, 2022).

The active stage of the second phase of the war - the campaign to capture Donbas began on April 18, 2022, when the Russian artillery, with the help of the air component, began intensive artillery treatment of the cities and operational-tactical depths located on the contact line of the Donetsk, Luhansk and bordering Kharkiv regions. Both the defense lines on the front line, as well as the critical infrastructure and high-value objects in the surrounding cities were bombed.

Soon after, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, officially announced that the battle for Donbas had begun, and at the same time, the head of the Luhansk Regional Military Administration, Serhiy Gaidai, called on the locals to immediately begin evacuation (The Hill, 2022).

After April 18, continuous shelling of settlements in the Donbas region continued, followed by the attack of 7 times more Russian military forces on the Ukrainian military group stationed in Donbas in all directions of the front.

After the initial positional battles, it appeared that despite the US and Western aid, the artillery capabilities of the Russian armed forces were still significantly higher than the Ukrainian ones, and considering that Ukraine, in the face of threats from Belarus, still had a large part of its forces stationed near the capital Kyiv, and On the Russian side, the main combat units were concentrated in the southern and eastern directions of the front.

The tempo of the ground attack in the Donbas region has increased especially since the end of April, when the Russian forces were able to capture the cities of Popasnaya, Liman, and Rubezhnoe in the Lugansk region, as a result of which the Russian units went to the natural barrier at the intersection of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the river Severskyi Donetsk, and started the actions necessary to overcome it, however, appeared precisely here with precision-targeting artillery shells transferred by the US to Ukraine, with the use of which Ukrainian artillery was able to destroy several large Russian groups near the river bank, which significantly slowed down the pace of

the attack and the effectiveness of the fighting Russian forces.

At the same time, intensive battles continued for the tactically important cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, in case of their quick capture, the Russian Armed Forces would receive a favorable springboard for the development of further clashes, however, taking into account the difficult situation in Severodonetsk, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine decided to fight to the end and defend the city, which we can practically say, that decided the fate of the Donbas campaign in the second phase of the war (Forbes, 2022).

The battle for Severodonetsk continued throughout May and June, as a result of daily urban battles and mutual artillery duels, the city was destroyed and brought heavy casualties to the Ukrainian armed forces. After Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, engaged in the subsequent push, the Russian armed forces, instead of continuing further offensive actions towards the depths of the Donbas region, had to take an operational pause and replenish the losses suffered as a result of the capture of 2 not-so-large cities, most importantly, so that the possibility of further progress no longer appeared.

Nevertheless, the Russian military-political leadership announced to the public the first tangible victory in the second phase of the war by capturing Lysichansk-Severodonetsk and announced the "liberation" of the Lugansk regional administration with the full borders, although the fact was that the strategic military goals announced at the beginning of the second phase of the war were not fulfilled this time either. Plans for a potential land and sea attack towards Odesa, thereby ruling out the occupation of the Odesa region and the creation of a land corridor with Transnistria, during the summer military campaign in Donbas, as well as the plans for the complete capture of the Donbas region, failed.

On the other hand, in the Ukrainian forces, in the background of the great losses experienced by the General Staff as a result of the decision to fight to the

end, and the demonstration to the West of Russia's razing of peaceful cities to the ground once again, the pace of supplying weapons to Ukraine from the West has been radically accelerated.

The third phase of the war - the Ukrainians gaining the operational initiative on the front and the counter-attacks of Kharkiv and Kherson

The operational pause caused by the failure of the Russian armed forces to implement the military goals set in the second phase of the war and the necessity to replenish the lost large resources lasted for the Russian forces from the end of June to the middle of July.

During the period caused by the operational pause, the Armed Forces of Ukraine received significant military assistance from the US and Western countries, with new priorities for the supply of weapons, to eliminate the significant artillery shortages shown in the Donbas campaign, to balance the qualitative balance of firepower and to increase the armored capabilities, which included M142 HIMARS type Multi-caliber salvo rocket systems and GPS/INS-guided munitions of the GMLRS type for cutting precision targeting, AGM-88 HARM type anti-aircraft radar missiles, an increased number of 155mm artillery shells and 155mm artillery systems, M1224 MaxxPro MRAP-type armored vehicles, M113-type armored personnel carriers and Soviet-made T-72-type tanks (Defense News, 2022).

The fact was that the new priorities for the supply of weapons significantly increased the qualitative and effective range of the missile-artillery fist of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and at the same time, it allowed the Armed Forces of Ukraine to form new combat units equipped with Western and Soviet armor, which would move from defense to attack with specific directions.

In contrast to the supplied armor, the effectiveness of the M142 HIMARS-type multi-caliber salvo fire reactive systems and air-based AGM-88 HARM-type radar anti-missiles was immediately apparent at the front.

In the case of the M142 HIMARS, the Ukrainians took advantage of the surprise effect and began along the entire length of the front to destroy high-value Russian facilities and military equipment located in the tactical-operational depths of the Russian defense lines, in particular using GPS/INS-guided GMLRS missiles, combined with satellite and aerial reconnaissance, at a maximum distance of 80-90 km from the detected targets, massed fire production was carried out with pre-programmed coordinates, thus destroying dozens of Russian ammunition warehouses, military equipment accumulation and repair points, permanent and temporary bases, command headquarters, and important logistic nodes.

At the same time, Western aviation engineers integrated American-made AGM-88 HARM air-to-ground anti-radar missiles with a range of 150 km on the Soviet-made Su-27 and Mig-29 fighter jets in the Ukrainian Air Force. at a distance of, both on pre-programmed coordinates and through radio signals, after launching in autonomous mode with an active radar head, it most accurately destroys enemy air-head radars and mobile anti-aircraft missile systems, which have radar stations built into the launch vehicle.

From the end of June and throughout the summer, especially during the first month of the appearance of these systems, practically every day the Ukrainian Air Force and artillery with AGM-88 HARM rockets and M142 HIMARS multi-caliber salvo fire reactive systems hit dozens of important targets along the entire length of the front. In the tactical-operational depths, which significantly limited the offensive potential of the Russian Armed Forces after the end of the operational pause, and this was well reflected, from July 15, 2022, when the Russian Armed Forces began

a new phase of offensive operations in the Donbas region.

This time, offensive operations began in the vicinity of Bakhmut and Avdeevka districts in the Donetsk region, however, for almost 20 days, the offensive thrusts of the Russian units, exhausted by the use of long-range artillery ammunition received from the US by Ukrainian artillery units, achieved only a few hundred meters of success and became able to supply. Before extending the lines, they would again switch to less active offensive actions.

It was during this period that the Ukrainian armed forces gained operational initiative in several directions of the front and brought the combat situation under control.

Since the beginning of July, the military and political leadership of Ukraine has started an intensive psycho-informational campaign about the inevitability of an expected large-scale counter-offensive in the Kherson region.

Already from July 11, the armed forces of Ukraine in the Kherson region, on the territories occupied by Russia on the right bank of the Dnieper River, launched tactical counter-attacks in several directions, which had clearly defined goals, which included gaining favorable positions necessary for further attacks by the Ukrainians on the right bank, producing combat intelligence and showing false directions of main attack to the enemy.

Along with small-scale multi-directional ground attacks, Ukrainian precision-targeting artillery and aviation began an intensive operation to destroy Russian facilities located in the Kherson region, including road and railway bridges over the Dnieper River, which were significantly damaged and disabled as a result of approximately one month of continuous bombardment.

Since mid-August, the number and scale of Ukrainian ground attacks on Russian-controlled territories on the right bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson have increased.

Three main directions of the attack were identified, aimed at dividing the Russian military group located on the right bank into two and neutralizing each part by encirclement.

At the same time, the statements of high-ranking Ukrainian officials were strengthened by the need to launch an upcoming counteroffensive in Kherson, which made it possible for the Russian military leadership to transfer units of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Russian Armed Forces defending the Kharkiv region from the Eastern Front to Kherson, thereby significantly weakening the fighting ability of the Russian group in Kharkiv and defensive efficiency.

On August 29, Volodymyr Zelensky officially announced that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had launched a large-scale counteroffensive to retake Kherson (News Week, 2022).

Ukrainian brigades equipped and trained with Western weapons took part in the attack on the right bank of the Dnieper River, which started active offensive operations on the northern and southern flanks of the Kherson front, while the 128th mountain combat brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces moved to attack in the central direction of the Kherson front.

Taking into account the real threats in the Kherson region, the Russian command accelerated the transfer of forces from Kharkiv to Kherson, which on September 6 was followed by an unexpected Ukrainian counterattack in the direction of Kharkiv - on the Balaklea-Izium line.

As a result of the transfer of combat-capable units of the Russian troops defending from the Baalaklea-Izium line to Kherson, the Ukrainian armed forces effectively used the vacuum created on the ground, and with a highly maneuverable attack, they were able to head-on take the Baalaklea settlement, which was followed by the complete collapse of the Russian defense, the breakthrough of Ukrainian units towards Izium-Kupiansk and 13 By February, in the Kharkiv region, the river Liberation of an area of 8000 km² on the right bank of Oskil.

The Ministry of Defense of Russia, in the background of the experienced defeat, instructed the armed forces to create a new defensive line on the left bank of the Oskil River and to maintain the positions, which became impossible due to the endless retreat, that is why the Ukrainian units were able to successfully cross the river and carry out further offensive operations in the previously lost Lugansk and Kharkiv regions (Fox News, 2022).

The Ukrainian counterattack of Kharkiv was finally stopped on October 2, when the Ukrainian units regained control of the city of Liman in the territory of Lugansk, already annexed by Russia, and reached the Russian defensive line of Svatovo-Kremennaya.

Throughout this period, the armed forces of Ukraine engaged in limited ground offensive operations and intensive air-artillery operations against the Russian group entrenched in the Kherson region, on the right bank of the Dnieper River, most importantly by destroying supply lines and disabling bridges over the Dnieper River, bringing Kherson under fire control. After many months of defensive operations, the Russian group faced a shortage of resources needed to continue effective defense, both in terms of manpower, ammunition, fuel, and most basically, providing food and first aid to the troops.

The problems in the defense appeared in the second half of October when the Ukrainian combat forces launched another new offensive push from the northern direction of the Kherson front, which was followed by the breakthrough of the first layer of the Russian defense line along the Dnieper coast and the rapid advance of the Ukrainian forces to the depths of the Kherson front, certainly in the direction of Kherson. Despite the initial resistance, the defending Russian units were unable to consolidate the new defensive line and were in danger of being encircled.

Already from October 22, under the guise of a peaceful approach, the evacuation of Russian forces from the right bank of the Dnieper River in the Kherson region began. Thousands of Russian soldiers dressed in civilian uniforms left the right bank of the Dnieper

River in the Kherson region using pontoon bridges and ferries.

At the beginning of November, the pace of the Ukrainian ground attack was further strengthened, already during November 9-10-11, Ukrainian forces were able to enter the city of Kherson and raise the Ukrainian flag on the city administration building, thereby successfully ending the 2022 summer autumn campaign of the Kherson counteroffensive (BBC, 2022).

As a result of the successful counter-offensives of Kherson and Kharkiv, the myth of Russia's invincibility was once again shattered, which made the West more self-confident and single-minded in the matter of supplying weapons to Ukraine.

The effective utilization of the supplied modern weapons and their qualitative use in practice gave the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in addition to small tactical directions, an operational initiative on almost the entire front, for further offensive actions, which will be aimed at the complete liberation of the Ukrainian territories, and the strategic goals of the Russian military-political leadership, which provided for the demilitarization of Ukraine Denazification failed, as well as Russian strategic goals that were reduced in the later phases of the war, which meant the complete occupation of the Donbas region and the land connection with Transnistria by taking the Odesa region.

From the end of 2022 to the first half of 2023, the US, together with its allies, began to transfer to Ukraine such weapons systems, the supply of which was previously taboo and was perceived as the basis for further escalation of the war, although the situation on the front, in particular, the high efficiency of the Ukrainian armed forces and Combat ability, in turn, with the low capability of the Russian armed forces and the need to prevent them from posing a threat to civilians with terrorist goals, the US flagship, with the help of the West, made Ukraine a state with a powerful military potential, which can turn the "world's 2nd" army into just 2nd army in Ukraine.

Conclusion

The conclusion of the presented research paper includes the main results obtained based on the conducted research.

In modern reality, where states still use the power factor to achieve their national interests and expand their influence, it is most important for the self-preservation of small and weak states to have a strong ally that provides military-political-economic support to the challenges.

At the expense of such a strong ally, from the period before and after the start of Russia's large-scale military aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine received a wide range of political-economic and military-technical assistance from the USA, which made it possible that before the start of the war, the Russian

military-political elite The strategic goals announced by Ukraine, which included the denazification-demilitarization of Ukraine, could not be realized, and at the same time, with the military assistance provided to Ukraine, it became possible to start the procedures for the de-occupation of the Ukrainian territories, within the framework of which the armed forces of Ukraine, using various types of weapons systems supplied by the USA, first repelled large-scale and multi-directional Russian military aggression, and then, with the operational initiative gained at the front, carried out effective and complex counter-attacks to liberate territories in different operational directions, thereby returning part of the lost territories, with prospects for further progress.

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