

The Role of U.S. in the Russian-Ukraine Conflict Since the Period of Crimea Occupation till 2022

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Abstract

The paper aims to explore what role the US acquires in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. More specifically, the research emphasizes on two events, particularly the Russian-Ukraine armed conflict that occurred in 2014 and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict launched in 2022. In this regard, the paper will attempt to analyze the indirect interference of the USA in the conflicts, namely imposing economic sanctions against Russia and sending military equipment to Ukraine. In the last part of the paper, the findings are presented. To explain the US role in the Russian-Ukrainian war, the research paper applies realism and geopolitical Rimland theories.

Keywords: Occupation, Russian-Ukraine Conflict, U.S.

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Introduction

In 2014, Russia implemented military intervention against Ukraine and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. This event shocked the world, especially the international democratic community. Western countries condemned the Kremlin in aggression and decided to assist Ukraine but their position was not to be involved in the conflict from the military point of view. As a result of Russian aggression, the U.S made the decision to strengthen the support for Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. Ukraine has undergone many dramatic changes since 2014 country's Revolution of Dignity, which was also known as the Euromaidan Revolution (Cory Welt, 2001). Ukraine was forced to face Russia's intervention and annexation of the Crimea region, as well as the Russian-led separatist movement in the east part of Ukraine – Donetsk and Lugansk Regions and increasing Kremlin control near the Azov and the Black Seas (Juanino, 2022). In this regard, official Kyiv adopted the measures to develop a military potential of territorial defense, and also gained the independence for autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

Official Washington has been a long supporting partner of Ukraine's Independence, development of democratic institutions, reaching good governance, and strengthening the statehood. Since the period of 2014, many members of congress had attempted to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and they promoted sanctions against Russia and simultaneously supported the Ukraine's security and economic aid.

The research paper explores the role of the USA in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and relations within the period 2014-2022. In order to demonstrate a sophisticated view of potential solutions, this topic examines the history of Russia-Ukraine relations and the USA's role, and how the aggressive policy of the Kremlin led to the conflict. The historical background is very important when realizing the modern understanding of

Russia and Ukraine by their own citizens and how they view whatever is happening nowadays - in 2022.

One additional note is that this article attempts to explain the actions of some actors using the tools of geopolitics. Geopolitics is a form of understanding/studying the attitudes towards current political events in a wider way by evaluating the importance of such factors as for example, economics, history, and geography (Götz, 2022). Viewing the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the role of the U.S. helps to provide a holistic view of the issue, and at the same time, find the path going to the solutions.

Based on the above-mentioned facts, the research question of the paper is the following: What role does the U.S play in the Russia-Ukraine conflicts and how effective was and is US involvement within 2014-2022?

Theoretical Framework - The research paper will be guided through the theories of Realism and Geopolitical Rimland. Political realism was a response to liberalism, whose starting point was that states do not seek cooperation. The early realists Edward Carr and Hans Morgenthau saw states as selfish rational entities seeking power for their own safety. Any cooperation between countries is perceived as an accident; for realists, the Second World War was a kind of confirmation of their ideas. It should also be noted that modern realists often refer to classical realists such as Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Machiavelli as "Founding Fathers". While their ideas are often in line with realist doctrine, they may not even fully define themselves as realists (Ashley, 1981).

Political realism, unlike other theories of international relations, paints a sad picture of international relations. International relations are seen as fierce competition between countries that have no reason to trust each other when the essence of their existence is self-preservation in conditions where the loss of one is the gain of the other (zero-sum game).

John Mearsheimer offers the clearest and most comprehensive description of realism. It outlines five main ideas that describe a realistic approach to international relations:

The first point of view is that the international system is anarchic, that is, the principle of the international system is anarchic, which means that the system consists of independent political units (states) that do not have supreme power. In other words, there is no supreme governing body, no superpower, and sovereignty is an inalienable feature of states (Barkin, 2010).

The second point of view is that states naturally have weapons of aggression that can be used against each other. Usually, it is a military weapon. However, not to be a weapon, realism says that people will use their hands and feet for military purposes.

The third point of view is that states are never sure what the intentions of another state are. In particular, no state has a guarantee that it will not use aggressive weapons against another state. This second state may be benevolent and reliable, but this view cannot be relied upon, since it is impossible to determine one hundred percent intention. In other words, there is no avoiding uncertainty in assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have aggressive intentions along with aggressive weapons (Bell, 2008).

The fourth point of view is that the main driving motive of states is self-preservation because they want to preserve sovereignty.

The fifth point of view says that states think strategically about how to survive in the international system.

States are basically rational. However, sometimes they may not be able to determine behavior because they operate in an incomplete information world where a potential adversary has an excuse to hide their true strength or weakness and hide their true intentions. Therefore, Mearsheimer distinguishes three main forms of state behavior:

States are afraid of each other because they are constantly threatened by danger from other states;

States depend only on themselves because other states are a potential threat. According to Kenneth Waltz, states operate in a "self-help" mode. Accordingly, alliances are considered a temporary phenomenon, and tomorrow they can become an ally of today's rival, and tomorrow the enemy of today's ally. Therefore, realists conclude that states should be selfish and look after their national interests. This view remains unchanged in both the short and long term;

States seek to increase their relative power in relation to other countries. Because the more military advantage, he has, the safer the country. Every state wants to be a strong military force because that is the best way to ensure its own security in a dangerous environment. The same motive logically dictates to states to wage war whenever possible and when profit is likely. The ideal solution is to have a hegemonic system. Then self-preservation would be almost guaranteed (Crawford, 2000).

The central view of realism that needs to be emphasized is that anarchy provokes competition and conflict between states and stifles the desire for cooperation in them even in the presence of common interest. This view is at odds with neoliberal theories that states can cooperate (Gilpin, 1984).

In the introduction to his work, Hans Morgenthau sets out six principles of political realism to dispel misunderstandings about what political realism is:

Politics is rooted in the permanently unchanging nature of man, which is selfish and egocentric.

Politics is an autonomous sphere and cannot be reduced to economics (as Marxists do) or to morality (as Kant's liberal theory often does). Heads of state must act according to the dictates of political wisdom. The main means of understanding their way for them is the concept of national interests.

Personal interests are an expressive fact of human beings. The minimum self-interest of all human beings is self-preservation and security. Politics is an

arena where these interests are expressed and these interests will inevitably collide with each other which will sooner or later lead to conflict. International politics is also an arena for conflicts of interest between states. The interests of states change over time and the environment. Realism is a doctrine that responds to changing political realities.

The ethics of international relations is a political and situational ethic that is very different from personal morality. A political leader does not have the freedom to act on the basis of moral principles unlike an ordinary citizen because he is responsible to the people and in his hands is their safety and well-being. Selecting the most profitable of the possible outcomes is the highest achievement of a politician (Crawford, 2000).

Realism holds that the moral goals of no nation or state can be regarded as universal moral laws (even for a democratic nation like the United States) and that they cannot be imposed on another state by force. Realists oppose this because it poses a threat to international security. It is possible that at some point the ideology imposed by force will have the opposite effect and the "crusading" country itself will be endangered.

The highest morals and ethics of a politician are the interests of his country.

The current war between Russia and Ukraine can be followed back to 2014 and upon closer assessment, well some time recently the turn of the 21st century. February's intrusion of Ukraine under the heading of Russian President Vladimir Putin propelled Eastern Europe to the cutting edge of the geopolitical arrangement (Bell, 2021).

With regard to Geopolitical Rimland, it is a geopolitical concept introduced by the American political scientist Nicholas Speakman in 1940 in his work "Geography of Peace" in opposition to Mackinder's Heartland. Rimland Speakman called the arc of the coastal strip surrounding the Heartland from the west, south, and southeast. Unlike Mackinder, Speakman believed that this land was of decisive strategic importance for the control of Eurasia. Thus, N. Spykman, with his concept of the Rimland, supplemented one of the

fundamental constructions of H. Mackinder, which determined the structure of geopolitical science. Heartland and Rimland are what is today associated with the geopolitical structure of the world. Rimland became exactly the concept that formed the basis of the post-war foreign policy doctrine of the United States, it is in this zone that the United States, having acquired the status of a superpower, implements most of the ideas related to maintaining and strengthening its own influence.

Methods

With regards to the research Methods, the following methods have been used:

1) **Quantitative research methods** were used in the research paper, particularly determining the volume of financial support, that the USA has released to Ukraine and the number of military entities, which has been delivered to Ukraine during the Russia-Ukraine war;

2) **Methods of comparative analysis** – related to the analysis of the military intervention of Russia against Ukraine in 2014 and in 2022 and their consequences, also a reaction to both interventions, etc.

3) **Content analysis** - the study of for example the content of the research of leading specialists in the field of International Relations;

4) **Narrative analysis** – related to the deep analysis of all those processes, which are going on in the framework of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Role of the USA in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, 2014

This part of the research paper reviews the war between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 and USA's indirect involvement in it, specifically imposing sanctions against Russia and condemning Russian aggression.

Context

The Russo-Ukrainian War began in February 2014 following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, and initially focused on the status of Crimea and the Donbas,

internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. The first eight years of the conflict included the Russian annexation of Crimea (2014) and the war in Donbas (2014–present) between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists, as well as naval incidents, cyber warfare, and political tensions. Following a Russian military build-up on the Russia–Ukraine border in late 2021, the conflict expanded significantly when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Olsen, 2022). Taking after the Euromaidan dissents and an insurgency coming about within the evacuation of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, pro-Russian turmoil emitted in parts of Ukraine. Russian officers without symbols took control of strategic positions and framework within the Ukrainian domain of Crimea and seized the Crimean Parliament. Russia organized a questionable choice, whose result was for Crimea to connect to Russia. This led to the addition of Crimea (Malyarenko, 2018). In April 2014, shows by pro-Russian bunches within the Donbas locale of Ukraine raised into a war between the Ukrainian military and Russian-backed separatists of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk republics. In Admirable 2014, unmarked Russian military vehicles crossed the border into the Donetsk republic. An undeclared war started between Ukrainian strengths on one side, and separatists mixed with Russian troops on the other, in spite of the fact that Russia endeavored to stow away its association. The war settled into inactive strife, with rehashed fizzled endeavors at a ceasefire. In 2015, the Minsk II understandings were marked by Russia and Ukraine, but a number of debates anticipated them being completely executed. By 2019, 7% of Ukraine was classified by the Ukrainian government as incidentally possessed regions (Teplova, 2022).

This all started as a domestic Ukrainian emergency in November 2013, when President Viktor Yanukovich rejected a bargain for more prominent integration with the European Union, starting mass challenges, which Yanukovich endeavored to put down savagely. Russia supported Yanukovich within the emergency, whereas the US and Europe backed the

nonconformists. Since that point, a few huge things have happened (Eshraghi, 2022). In February, anti-government challenges toppled the government and ran Yanukovich out of the nation. Russia, attempting to rescue its misplaced impact in Ukraine, attacked and attacked Crimea the following month. In April, pro-Russia separatist rebels started seizing the region in eastern Ukraine.

U.S. Sanctions against Russia

In reaction to the heightening War in Donbas, on 17 July 2014, the Joined together States expanded its exchanges boycott to two major Russian vitality firms, Rosneft and Novatek, and to two banks, Gazprombank and Vnesheconombank. The United States too encouraged EU pioneers to connect the third wave driving EU to begin drafting European sanctions a day before. On 25 July, the EU authoritatively extended its sanctions to an extra 15 people and 18 substances, taken after by an extra eight people and three substances on 30 July (Gelariots, 2022). On 31 July 2014 the EU presented the third circular of sanctions which included a ban on arms and related fabric, and ban on dual-use merchandise and innovation expecting for military utilize or a military conclusion client, a boycott on imports of arms and related fabric, controls on sending out of hardware for the oil industry, and a limitation on the issuance of and exchange in certain bonds, value or comparable money related disobedient on development more prominent than 90 days (Juanino, 2022).

On 3 October 2014, US bad habit president Barak Obama said that "It was America's authority and the president of the Joined together States demanding, oftentimes nearly having to humiliate Europe to stand up and take financial hits to force costs" and included that "And the comes about have been a gigantic capital flight from Russia, a virtual solidify on a remote coordinate venture, a ruble at an all-time moo against the dollar, and the Russian economy wavering on the brink of retreat (Olsen, 2022). We do not need Russia to break down. We need Russia to succeed. But Putin has got to. make

a choice. These deviated propels on another nation cannot be endured. The worldwide framework will collapse in the event that they are.

On 18 December 2014, the EU prohibited a few ventures in Crimea, ending bolster for the Russian Dark Ocean oil and gas investigation and ceasing European companies from obtaining genuine bequest or companies in Crimea, or advertising tourism services. On 19 December 2014, US President Obama forced sanctions on Russian-occupied Crimea by official arranging forbidding sends out of US products and administrations to the locale (Upusf, 2022).

The USA Supports Ukraine Before and After 2022

Most Democrats and Republicans are pushing for a consensus in support of Ukraine's resistance to Russia. Both sides support the law as the best US tool for protecting democracy in Ukraine and beyond.

“When Putin decided to launch an unwarranted invasion of his neighbor, President Putin intended to divide the United States, its allies, and partners. And yet we are stronger and more united than ever. “The Kremlin thought it would undermine or even topple the Ukrainian government, but President Zelensky and the democratically elected government of Ukraine stand firm,” the US State Department said in a statement. Russian troops lost the battle for Kyiv and continued their slow and crushing offensive in the east and south of Ukraine. The help of the United States and its more than 40 allies and partners continue to strengthen Ukraine's position on the battlefield to protect its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Ukraine is a key regional strategic partner for the United States, which has made significant efforts to modernize its armed forces and make them more compatible with NATO.

How the U.S. is Helping Ukraine

In order to clearly understand the role and place of the United States in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, we need

to know to what extent and in what way the United States is helping Ukraine.

Since January 2021, the United States has invested more than \$63 billion in security assistance to demonstrate its strong commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes more than \$56 billion since Russia launched a deliberate, unprovoked, and brutal war against Ukraine on February 24, of which \$40 billion was disbursed on May 19. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than \$83 billion in security training and equipment assistance to help Ukraine maintain its territory. Integrity, border protection, and improved interoperability with NATO.

Ukraine has already received most of its weapons as part of a \$200 million military aid package announced in December 2021. On February 26, 2022, President Joe Biden announced that with US permission, an additional \$350 million worth of US-supplied Stinger anti-aircraft guns, as well as Javelin missile systems from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, would be transferred to Ukraine with US permission. The United States has also reportedly diverted Mi-17 helicopters originally intended for Afghanistan.

In addition, USAID announced an additional \$25 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, bringing the total to \$38.6 million by FY2022. On the ground, USAID is partnering with United Nations agencies to deliver emergency supplies throughout Ukraine, including food, surgical and medical kits, thermal blankets, and sanitation supplies.

Border Security

Since 2017, the State Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation has provided more than \$34.8 million to Ukraine under the Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program to support proliferation, counterterrorism, demining, and related programs. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBS) was the main beneficiary of EXBS assistance.

EXBS also provided assistance to the Ukrainian customs service and export control and sanctions authorities. Prior to the full-scale invasion of Russia in 2022, the main focus of EXBS was on developing an operational and resilient SFSU maritime border capability to replace the capabilities lost by Russia during the illegal annexation of Crimea and introducing upgraded equipment, training, and procedures.

State Partnership Program

Ukraine cooperates with the California National Guard under the State Partnership Program (SPP) of the Department of Defense. Founded in 1993, the purpose of the SPP was to help former Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union in their quest for democracy and to reform their defense forces after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the past 29 years, the California National Guard has engaged in regular combat engagements with Ukrainian forces, which has helped modernize Ukraine's defenses.

Joint Exercises

Ukraine participates in numerous bilateral and multilateral military exercises with the US, the European Union, and NATO allies, including Rapid Trident, Sea Breeze, and Cossack Mace.

U.S. Cybersecurity Assistance

In response to Russian cyberattacks, US assistance is indispensable. The FBI is helping Ukraine with its unique investigative and intelligence capabilities. Technical experts funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are exploring new mechanisms to leverage services offered by U.S. and Ukrainian cybersecurity service providers to support and strengthen the Ukrainian government's cyber defense capabilities to develop more than \$40 million in cybersecurity opportunities since 2017. By rendering. Among these efforts:

In 2020, USAID launched an ambitious \$38 million cybersecurity reform program that will focus on strengthening Ukraine's cybersecurity legislative and regulatory framework over the next few years.

New Help Package

On May 19, Congress approved more than \$40 billion in additional aid to Ukraine. The total amount of U.S. commitments to Ukraine has risen to about \$54 billion since the Russian invasion, along with a bailout package in March. Forty percent of the aid was spent on arms supplies, medical and intelligence support from European allies, and stationing troops there. Passed Thursday, the bill authorizes President Biden to allow Ukraine to transfer an additional \$11 billion in arms, equipment, and defense materials to the United States, as well as \$9.1 billion for resupply.

A small portion of the assistance will be provided to local agencies to enforce sanctions and export controls put in place by the government to weaken the Russian economy. And some assistance will go to diplomatic programs that will help keep the services of U.S. citizens in the region. Of the total US spending of \$54 billion, \$31.4 billion can be considered traditional foreign aid. According to the US Agency for International Development, this exceeds the annual amount released by the US over the past decade.

That's about double the 2011 increase for Afghanistan, the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid to date. The \$54 billion total aid represents about one percent of this year's federal budget. This year's defense budget. This is more than the government spent on subsidies last year.

U.S. Aid Compared to Other Countries

According to data compiled by the German research institute at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the

United States has invested about three times more money than all EU countries combined.

The United States has pledged far more aid to Ukraine than to any other country since the start of the Russian invasion earlier this year, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. From January 24 to May 10, the US has pledged about \$42.95 billion (equivalent to €40 billion), while all other countries have pledged a total of \$25.3 billion (€23.6 billion), explains Kilsky. institute in a working paper.

But when pledged donations are compared to donor countries' GDP — a measure of a country's gross domestic product — the US comes in fourth place, according to the Kiel Institute. Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, all countries bordering Ukraine or Russia, pledged to help Ukraine with at least 0.4% of their GDP from January 24, while the US pledged to provide Ukraine with 0.22% of GDP by May 10.

The Role of the United States in Imposing Sanctions against Russia

For many years, many believed that a world of global economic networks and interdependencies—nations tightly connected by supply chains and finances—had made war obsolete. This is partly why Russia's invasion of Ukraine was so shocking. But the international economy itself has become a battleground. A conventional war in Ukraine has sparked a fast-paced and shocking economic conflict led by the United States and its allies against Russia. And this war is being waged with the help of new weapons created in the era of global networks after the end of the Cold War. When it comes to multipolar politics, when it comes to global networks, there is only one superpower: the United States. Many global networks have centralized points of economic suppression that the US can seize and turn into weapons of coercion. No other country can match these opportunities. America can now redistribute global networks to crush oligarchs, banks, and even entire

countries, as Russia has painfully discovered. Now the United States must decide how to dispose of this enormous power. If he overdoes it, he may provoke a military response or create an incentive for his adversaries to build and strengthen their own alternative networks.

The United States, along with more than 30 partners around the world, has imposed unprecedented sanctions and export controls to hold President Putin accountable for the war against Ukraine, limit Russia's access to the critical technology it needs to fund its war machine, and turn Russia into a country. It is a global financial value.

The United States has also introduced controls that prevent companies from sending a wide range of goods to Russia, including aviation, defense, and transportation components, as well as high-tech goods such as semiconductors and telecommunications equipment.

This control of American exports is intended to undermine Russia's ability to confiscate the goods it needs to fight a long war, but it also aims to undermine the production of high-value goods and other unrelated domestic economic activities. Military efforts such as commercial aviation will have no problem getting spare parts for their aircraft. In addition, there is an almost total embargo on US companies exporting anything to the Russian military. The United States also took a step that just over a week ago seemed to do more than they wanted: the Biden administration banned imports of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal into the United States.

Russia's economy is in decline due to financial and trade sanctions, export controls, and an outflow of about 1,000 US and multinational companies. Analysts predict a double-digit decline in Russia's GDP in 2022, rising inflation in 2022, and Putin's war is likely to wipe out Russia's economic gains over the past 15 years.

More than 600 private sector companies have already left the Russian market. Supply chains in Russia

are seriously disrupted. Russia is likely to lose its status as a major economy and remain in economic, financial, and technological isolation for a long time to come.

In addition to the comprehensive sanctions imposed by the US as a superpower, we must also see their efforts to prevent Russia from easing sanctions in any way. The biggest mystery in this regard for America was China. China, which is one of Russia's biggest partners, and the tension that existed between the US and China really served as an excuse. But official US sources say China is not helping Russia ease sanctions or supplying weapons. We can easily see the American influence on China's actions. The United States has made it clear that all countries helping Russia will be punished, an example of which is Belarus, which is currently under sanctions. Therefore, it is important to note that for sanctions to work, multifaceted efforts are needed.

What Does This Amount of U.S. Aid Indicate?

"This amount of US aid is comprehensive and is designed to help Ukraine win the war," said William Waldorf Jr., a professor of politics and international affairs at Wake Forest University.

US assistance is a huge investment in Ukraine's democracy and defense. But how far can this go?

Ukraine's resistance — with the help of Western-supplied weapons — has thwarted Russia's original military goals, forcing it to reconsider and focus its campaign on Ukraine's east and south. The United States is Ukraine's largest donor, and without their comprehensive assistance, it would be very difficult for Ukraine to resist Russia at this time.

This latest flow of support shows strong US support for Ukraine, and some experts suggest that the US should use this aid package as leverage to try to bring Russia to the negotiating table.

In recent weeks, the Biden administration has also begun to articulate its goals in this conflict: to weaken Russia and support the Ukrainian people in defending their country. "Ukraine clearly believes it can win, as does everyone here," Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said at a meeting with his Defense Department counterpart last month. "Ukraine needs our help today to win, and it will still need our help when the war is over."

But it is not clear what a "victory" in Ukraine really looks like for Ukraine or its partners in the West, is it a defeat for Russia? Or put Russia at the negotiating table?

It does not seem obvious that US goals, NATO goals, and European goals are in line with Ukraine's goals.

America's purpose determines its role and place in this conflict

Whether America wants to defeat Russia or weaken it is a big difference between the two, and in order to determine this, we need to consider several aspects.

Can America Help Ukraine More?

On the military front, weapons systems produced and supplied by the US and Europe played a significant role in hindering Russia's advance. For example, the Javelin anti-tank missile system is a light American-made saber that allows one or two Ukrainian infantrymen to take on a Russian tank.

The United States must also take urgent action to help bolster the defenses of NATO allies that border Ukraine directly. The administration's recent additional funding is not helping these allies; It only includes the payment and replenishment of American troops sent from Europe. Allies like Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states need weapons that will allow them to target and destroy parts of Russian tanks - weapons such as

ATACM (surface-to-surface missiles), HIMAR (long-range artillery missiles) and PRSM (long-range missiles) - long-range, high-precision missiles). Due to their short range, these weapons were well suited to the Eastern European landscape and saw little use in the war against China. The mere fact of their delivery to the countries on this front line will strengthen the restraint of NATO and send a clear signal to Putin that an attack on NATO will lead to heavy casualties.

Oksana Markarova, Ukraine's ambassador to the US, warned that Ukraine was running out of Javelins and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; She has formally demanded additional supplies from the US, and we often hear President Zelenskiy claim in the media that the aid he has promised arrives too late in Ukraine, often months in advance. However, on the economic front, the West could consider increasing the number of banks blacklisted by the SWIFT system.

The \$40 billion that the US recently spent on Ukraine is indeed a large amount, but this amount will not be spent on Ukraine as a whole. Not to be forgotten is the fact that the US topped the list of countries with the highest military spending in 2021, with \$801 billion in military spending. This amounted to 38 percent of world military spending that year, or \$2.1 trillion.

Fear of Nuclear War

To say today that the Cold War is not over yet is partly true. Compared to the Cold War period, we no longer have a bipolar world, everyone saw Russia's weapons and the possibility of waging war. At the same time, today, in the wake of public statements about assistance to Ukraine, during the years of the Cold War, on the contrary, they silently denied involvement in the puppet war, although everyone knew about it. This is direct assistance to Ukraine. But to say that America is not afraid of the nuclear threat is a lie. Until now, Putin has threatened the West and NATO, but he has not gone further than Ukraine. According to experts, there is a risk

that Putin may define US support as an escalation, and the US should have a plan for this case. The United States must be careful about how these actions are perceived in Moscow. This could convincingly escalate into a nuclear war that no one can win, including Ukraine. On the other hand, an overly aggressive response such as a "no-fly zone" will almost certainly lead to a wider war between the US and Russia.

In the context of Ukraine, the US and its allies have not publicly presented any plan for negotiations with Russia.

If they weren't clearer in their communication with Russia, this uncertainty would make the entire U.S. strategy less effective—at least if the goal is to reach some kind of political solution that would end the war in Kyiv without a change.

Economic and Military Parameters of U.S. Support to Ukraine

Economic Sanctions

The USA and other Western countries, in addition to political support for Ukraine, responded to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine with severe economic sanctions, which was reflected in an unprecedented package of sanctions. The move by the USA and the West, in general, is seen as an attempt to impose an economic price for military aggression and is ultimately aimed at reducing Russia's military-economic capabilities, which are currently costing thousands of innocent lives. It is a fact that the imposed restrictions have already brought quite heavy economic consequences to Russia, although it is interesting to what extent it is possible to achieve the political goals that push President Putin to stop military operations with sanctions. In general, it takes a medium to long term for sanctions to take effect. At this stage, Russia manages to live under mass restrictions, despite heavy economic losses. Russia is now experiencing its worst economic

downturn since the end of the Cold War. According to the calculations of the World Bank, in 2022 Russia's gross domestic product is expected to decrease by 11% (World Bank, 2022), and according to the forecast of the International Monetary Fund, this figure is 8.5% (IMF, 2022). Some estimates put the economic scale of the decline as high as 15% (IIF, 2022). All this largely depends on the potential consequences of the already imposed restrictions and the possibility of new sanctions, including the embargo on energy products. As a result of the world economic crisis of 2008, the Russian economy shrank by about 8%, and now this figure is twice as high. Therefore, we can have a certain idea about its scale. Over time the losses caused by the sanctions must become more visible and tangible, which will greatly aggravate the socio-economic situation in Russia in the coming years. According to the calculations of the International Financial Institute, by the end of 2023, Russia will lose the wealth created in the last 15 years (IIF, 2022). The reason for this, on the one hand, will be reduced domestic demand, and on the other hand, in the case of the expansion of the package of trade-related sanctions, there will be a sharp decrease in budget revenues due to more than expected exports. Russian military aggression has also had global economic consequences: the prices of basic consumer goods have risen, supply chains have been disrupted, and international trade has been disrupted.

3.2. Military aid

Taking into consideration the military aid to Ukraine, it is important to point out, that since January 2021, the United States has invested more than \$16.9 billion in security assistance to demonstrate the Official Washington enduring and steadfast commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes more than \$16.2 billion since Russia's launched its premeditated, unprovoked, and brutal war against Ukraine on February 24. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than \$19 billion in security assistance for training and equipment to help Ukraine preserve its

territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.

United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:

- Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
- Over 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;
- Over 32,000 other anti-armor systems;
- Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
- 126 155mm Howitzers and up to 806,000 155mm artillery rounds;
- 2,000 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds;
- 20 105mm Howitzers and 180,000 105mm artillery rounds;
- 126 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers;
- 22 Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment;
- 16 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition;
- 20 120mm mortar systems and 85,000 rounds of 120mm mortar rounds;
- 1,500 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
- Four Command Post vehicles;
- Eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions;
- High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
- 20 Mi-17 helicopters;
- Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
- Four trucks and eight trailers to transport heavy equipment;
- 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
- 40 MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles with mine rollers;
- Mine clearing equipment and systems;
- Over 10,000 grenade launchers and small arms;
- Over 60,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition;
- Over 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets;

- Approximately 700 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
- Laser-guided rocket systems;
- Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;
- 15 Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Systems;
- Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;
- Over 50 counter-artillery radars;
- Four counter-mortar radars;
- Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems;
- Ten air surveillance radars;
- Two harpoon coastal defense systems;
- 18 coastal and riverine patrol boats;
- M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions;
- C-4 explosives, demolition munitions, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing;
- Tactical secure communications systems;
- Thousands of night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders;
- Commercial satellite imagery services;
- Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear;
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;
- 100 armored medical treatment vehicles;
- Medical supplies to include first aid kits, bandages, monitors, and other equipment;
- Electronic jamming equipment;
- Field equipment, cold weather gear, and spare parts;
- Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.

As of September 9, 2022, nearly 50 US Allies and partner countries have provided security assistance to Ukraine. Among their many contributions to Ukraine, Allies and partners have delivered 10 long-range Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 178 long-range artillery systems, nearly 100,000 rounds of long-range artillery ammunition, nearly 250,000 anti-tank munitions, 359 tanks, 629 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 8,214 short-range air defense

missiles, and 88 lethal UAVs. Since February 24, Allies and partners worldwide have provided or committed over \$13 billion in security assistance (US Department of State, 2022).

Conclusion

The paper explored how the U.S. was effective in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine from 2014 to 2022. The goal of the paper was to reveal the importance of the U.S. role in the conflict and how the sanctions affect Russia.

The qualitative research method was applied to conduct the research and the paper answers the research question and proves the research question through the qualitative method of data analysis. Besides that the paper discussed the framework based on realism and rimlands theory and why these methods were important for the role states to follow, these theories gave the understanding to explain how effective the U.S. was in the conflict with Russia and what type of role was played with U.S. approach through realism and rimland.

It's important to mention that the interests explored in each role country because of the research question and the paper were divided into two parts. The first part describes the 2014 events of the conflict of how important and effective was U.S. role between Russia and Ukraine within this period. The first part also includes the sanctions following up on its effectiveness on Russia. In the second part, the dedication was to explain the war of 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, also under Biden's leadership the role of the USA, which includes the sanctions having been adopted by the U.S. towards Russia.

The 2022 case was very struggling to be noted on paper because it's difficult to make prognoses in advance about the result of the war, which means nobody knows the results and the outcomes and would be very wrong and inappropriate to speculate events

before even happens in international relations, this is why the 2014's case was easier, to sum up in general and state the facts on the research paper than the 2022's case.

The main finding of the research is the following: The U.S. is trying to support Ukraine in every possible

method except sending troops against Russia with the purpose to avoid WW 3.

Finally, to sum up, the content analysis, it's evident what the interests of the U.S have with the conflict and how effective the sanctions were against Russia within the period 2014-2022.

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