Abstract

The Vietnam War involved United States combat forces in the 1960s and 1970s. Decades later, the world observed the 2008 Georgia – Russia War.

This article examines parallels in military transformation between the U.S. Army post-Vietnam War and Georgian Army at the conclusion of the 2008 Georgia - Russia War. The U.S and Georgian Armies, at the end of their respective wars were clearly institutions in need of tectonic change. This article starts by providing a brief overview of both wars and conclude with an assessment of parallels in post-war transformation needs.

This article identifies parameters in which the United States Army found itself post-Vietnam War regarding military transformation. After doing so, juxtaposes this with the Georgian Army post-Georgia-Russia War.

This article identifies overlapping drivers of institutional change from both Wars. This article does this based on analysis and research of other authors, and my own personal experience as a retired senior U.S. Army officer and defense contractor who spent decades in this field.

The process of developing and implementing peacetime military change can take several decades. Therefore, stability in an organization’s mission and resources can be important (Nielson, 2010, pp. 4).

Through this study, future U.S. efforts in military transformation can be better understood and more effective. Increased effectiveness and understanding directly correlates to a compressed timeframe for military transformation efforts.

Through this article, one can see there are many parallels between the U.S. Army toward the end of the Vietnam War and with Georgia at the end of the 2008 Georgia-Russia War. Just as the U.S. made remarkable strides post-Vietnam, Georgia has made remarkable strides in military transformation through visionary leadership and abundance of will coupled with limitless intellectual capacity.

Keywords: Vietnam War, Military Transformation, 2008 Russia – Georgia War, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Curriculum Development (ADDIE), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), National Training Center (NTC), Former Soviet Union, Soviet Army, Change Management Strategy, Institutional Change
Introduction

Having lived through the U.S. Army military transformation in the 1970’s and 1980’s as an active duty service member, the author became acutely aware of the inner machinations, impact and results of the transformation effort. The author was a direct benefactor as an infantry officer in the demilitarized zone in Panmunjom, Korea, in the 1991 Gulf War and in subsequent conflicts.

Subsequently, the author worked as a military contractor aiding the military transformation of several former communist countries including Albania and Georgia. While engaged in this work, certain parallels between what drove U.S. military transformation and that of other countries became apparent.

The author found it instructive to address transformation issues by illustrating parallels between U.S. post-Vietnam War transformations with those of Georgia post-Russia War.

It is not the author’s intent to examine Russia’s role in either War. Clearly in both wars, Russia was a belligerent, masquerading as a neutral party while operating largely and often through proxy. Nor is it my intent to delve deeply into parameters of the Cold War. It is however, instructive for military professionals to assess the situation in which the United States Army found itself post-Vietnam War, and juxtapose this with the Georgian Army (GAF), post-2008 Georgia-Russia War.

Following the Vietnam War, an imperative developed among U.S. Army leaders in the mid-1970s to ‘save’ an Army that was recognized to be in crisis (Nielsen, 2010, p. 42). It is safe to say that Georgian leaders the author worked with also developed this imperative following the 2008 War with Russia.

Below the author first presents a brief overview of the 2008 Georgia – Russia War followed by an equally brief overview of the U.S. - Vietnam War. The author concludes this paper with parallels between the two countries’ need for military transformation.

Moving forward, it is important to understand what we mean when we use the terms reform, innovate and transform. Reform means “to improve (someone or something) by removing or correcting faults, problems, etc.” (merriam-webster.com, 2021). Innovation means “a new idea, device, or method” (merriam-webster.com, 2021). Transform means “to change in composition or structure” (merriam-webster.com, 2021).

Post 2008 Russia - Georgia War

Following the 2008 War, the GAF was clearly in distress and suffering from shock from the catastrophic defeat at the paws of the Russian Bear. As a tiny country with a weak economy, Georgia had to balance her imperatives between the threat and affordability, which impacted training, manpower, equipment purchases and technology. Having inherited the obsolete Soviet army system, the war provided impetus for the Georgians to move forward, faster with more in-depth engagement with their Western advisors, to fundamentally reform. After the war, Georgian leaders put immediate and intense effort into improving the GAF. I know this because immediately after the war, senior Georgian officers, normally reserved, began knocking on my door asking for immediate help with issues on which they were previously intransigent.

The GAF was in the midst of a significant transition in force structure to a more volunteer force. This aspect of transition is a massive undertaking in personnel management, training, budget and infrastructure issues. Georgia recognized new national imperatives, including a more flexible mission-command system guided by DOTMLPF-P. The GAF focused on their equipment modernization program discerning capabilities, force structure, cost, training, mission support and sustainment. DOTMLPF-P later drove the enhancement of a more functional Georgian TRADOC and Land Forces Command.

In research from Kogan (2013), Even though the GAF has about 7,000 well-trained personnel with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rest of the military are poorly trained and educated. In order to overcome these shortfalls, Alasania said in a recent interview with RIA Novosti that Georgia needs “a very small but highly mobile army that will be able to stand up to new threats” such as terrorism and extremism.

Regarding the Georgian performance in the 2008 War (Hamilton, 2009), highlights that when judging the GAF’s poor performance, one should consider from where the GAF started. Additionally, the time and money invested into the GAF are not conducive to creating a “mature, well-led, and fully combat-capable army.”

DOTMLPF-P stands for:

- Doctrine: the way we fight (e.g., emphasizing maneuver warfare, combined air-ground campaigns)
- Organization: how we organize to fight (e.g., divisions, air wings, Marine-Air Ground Task Forces)
- Training: how we prepare to fight tactically (basic training to advanced individual training, unit training, joint exercises, etc.)
- Materiel: all the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces that DOES NOT require a new development effort (weapons, spares, test sets, etc. that are “off the shelf” both commercially and within the government)
- Leadership and education: how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight (squad leader to 4-star general/admiral)
- Professional development
- Personnel: availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations
As a contractor training Georgian forces during this period, we felt the police background of the then Chief of Staff of the GAF, Major General Zaza Gogava hindered our progress. With the new post-war Chief of Staff, Major general Vladimer Chachibaia, a career military officer, the change was palpable and immediate.

As (Hamilton, 2009) notes the loss of the war to Russia appears to have been a catalyst for significant personnel change within the Georgian armed forces. Georgia finally had visionary leadership recognizing the need for sweeping reforms, which emphasized the enhancement of professionalism. The Georgians also focused intensely on standards-based decentralized training, professional military education including officer and NCO education systems, personnel management systems that included centralized assignments and promotions, and individual and organizational competence.

The post-war Georgian leadership did a much better job regarding change management. They incorporated the Champion Concept, though not identified as such, more often than ever before. They also recognized the dire need to continue to evolve in their planning and change management strategies.

The Georgians continued to address equipment issues as according to (Axe, 2020), the Georgians made multi-billion-dollar equipment upgrades in communications, anti-tank weaponry and air-defense systems.

In 2008, Georgia had yet to clearly define its defense structure. A country should build an Army structure based on its mission, not the other way around. Georgia moved quickly on this after the war.

The results of the war induced a sense of urgency in the military leadership to transform, reform and innovate. Down-sizing the officer corps and restructuring the force are examples.

Georgia has made tremendous strides in leaving the old system in the dust-bin of history. However, getting to the point the Georgians can operate effectively at the operational and strategic level including the integration of the interagency effort needs a lot of work.

In the aftermath of the 2008 Russia – Georgia War, Russia continued acts of lawlessness according to (Pike, n.d.), by declaring Abkhazia and South Ossetia independent states and keeping their military forces in those two districts.

While this article focuses on Georgia, the Russians had their own issues which also indicated some level of Georgian success. In research from Pike (n.d.-a), asked whether the fighting will influence the pace of Russia’s army modernization, Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy head of the General Staff said on Thursday, 14 August 2008 that the country would “draw serious conclusions” from the events.

However, this article is not about Russian reform. The Georgians were clearly not satisfied with their performance in the 2008 War. It is clear the Georgians recognized the need to continue military transformation, innovation and reform and they did so comprehensively and at a good pace.


After a decade-long effort in Indochina, the U.S. Army was in distress and in great need of transformation, reform and innovation:

Intolerably clobbered and buffeted from without and within by social turbulence, pandemic drug addiction, race war, sedition, civilian scapegoatise, draftee recalcitrance and malevolence, barracks theft and common crime, unsupported in their travail by the general government, in Congress as well as the executive branch, distrusted, disliked, and often reviled by the public, the uniformed services today are places of agony for the loyal, silent professions who doggedly hang on and try to keep the ship afloat (Heinl, Jr., 1971).

The Vietnam experiences shaped and molded the U.S. officer and NCO corps: “Although a generation of officers, including many of the Army’s future leaders, cut their combat teeth in Vietnam, many regretted that the Army’s reputation, integrity, and professionalism had been tainted in the service of a flawed strategy and a dubious ally” (Editors at CMH, 2001).

Army leaders, looking back after the war recognize and acknowledge the Army as it was then,

“The army in the 1970s was a terrible organization,” said Conrad Crane, a retired Army officer and chief of historical services at the Army Heritage and Education Center. Within a decade the U.S. military had solved most of its problems and was on its way to today’s volunteer force (Michaels, 2013).

The U.S. Army’s failures in Vietnam laid the groundwork, for generations to come, for study and analysis. Leaders looked at the picture and did not like what they saw. The Army was humbled and its members bitter. Accordingly, the War has
been analyzed for strategic and tactical shortcomings (Editors at CMH, 2001). The failure was unacceptable but issues leading to that failure took time to fix. It took proud and dedicated professionals who knew what needed to be fixed and stuck around to fix it. We questioned how we fought and how we should fight. Vietnam was an excellent doctrinal proving ground for combined arms warfare in addition to insurgency operations in that we combined the use of armor and artillery with airborne forces. As posited by (Editors at CMH, 2001), helicopters were still expected to move forces from one sector of the battlefield to another, to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance, to provide aerial fire support, and to serve as antitank weapons systems.

These questions ultimately led to new Army doctrine such as a new doctrine for battlefield action, published as Field Manual 100-5 Operations in 1976. The questions also led to a new National Training Center and the standing up of the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Like the Army of the Vietnam era, the postwar Army continued a common hallmark of the American military tradition by emphasizing technology and firepower over manpower (Editors at CMH, 2001).

In research from History.com Editors (2021),

The conflict was intensified by the ongoing Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. More than 3 million people (including over 58,000 Americans) were killed in the Vietnam War, and more than half of the dead were Vietnamese civilians.

By the 1980s the army dismissed many of the problem soldiers within its ranks and began to instill discipline and revamped training. Under President Reagan resources started pouring into the military. The draft had ended. It took nearly a decade to rebuild the military (Michaels, 2013).

As with the Georgians performance in the 2008 War, the Americans were clearly not satisfied with their performance in Vietnam.

**Vietnam – Georgia Post-War**

**Military Transformation Parallels**

Evidence is quite clear that following both wars, military leaders from both the Georgian and U.S. Armies stressed the imperative to ‘save’ an Army that was recognized to be in crisis.

The challenge for Georgia’s Army at the end of the 2008 War with Russia held many similarities to the U.S. Army at the end of the Vietnam War. Both armies, at the end of their respective wars, were institutions in need of serious transformation, reformation and innovation.

In both wars, Russia was a belligerent, masquerading as a neutral party while operating largely and often through proxy. It was not the author’s intent to fully examine Russia’s role in the U.S. - Vietnam War or 2008 Georgian - Russian War. It is however, instructive for military professionals and diplomats to assess the situation the United States Army found itself in post-Vietnam War, and juxtapose this with the GAF, post-2008 Georgia - Russia War.

Command issues plagued both armies at every level of war. In Vietnam, too often, commanders were flying in helicopters over their troops on the ground separating them not just physically but psychologically. Additionally, according to (Editors at CMH, 2001), Westmoreland never achieved unity of command.

Georgia was not immune from command issues either:

The General Staff, instead of operating out of a command center where it could be kept apprised of the conduct of the battle and keep the civilian leadership advised of the conduct of the battle, as well as the civilian leaders of the Ministry of Defense, decamped to an artillery unit headquarters near Tskhinvali and remained there throughout the conflict, often ignorant of the actual situation on the ground, and therefore unable to muster the necessary forces to halt or delay the invasion. Likewise, senior civilian leadership of the Georgian government, including civilian Deputy Ministers of Defense and the Secretary of the National Security Council, wandered into the battle area instead of remaining in a national command center where they could have affected the battle (Littell, 2008, as cited in Mangum, 2020).

Lack of experience plagued command behavior also. In research from Mangum (2020),

Deputy Ministers of Defense who had no military background, went onto the battlefield and began issuing, often conflicting, orders to military units. Clearly civil-military relations were turned upside down.

Just as the U.S. Army worked on finding balance in imperatives post-Vietnam, Georgia worked on finding balance in imperatives.
All militaries must strike a balance between varieties of imperatives. These include perceived security threats facing the nation, the state of the national economy, the available funding for training, operations and modernization, the available manpower, the state of operational and combat readiness, and the capabilities and limitations of the available technology. The U.S. Army developed and defined DOTMLPF-P to delineate and designate specific, assigned, organizational and functional responsibilities within the service to serve as the formula driving Army reform. Georgia used this formula in an increasingly effective manner after the 2008 war.

Post-war, both armies needed visionary leadership recognizing the need for sweeping reforms, which emphasized the enhancement of professionalism. General William Childs Westmoreland was the Chief of Staff (CSA) of the U.S. Army 1968 to 1972. The focus of Westmoreland’s reforms was what he termed “professionalism,” which he said involved “training, education, and individual and organizational competence” (Westmoreland, 1977, as cited in Nielson, 2010).

The 2008 War appears to have been a catalyst for significant personnel change within the Georgian armed forces which ushered in a visionary leader. Georgia invested intensive effort and resources in a campaign to enhance professionalization of the GAF.

In the 70’s, the U.S. Army was in the midst of a significant transition in force structure. This included a move to an all-volunteer force. In 2008, the GAF was transitioning from a conscription-based military to a more volunteer force. This aspect of transition alone, for both armies, is a massive undertaking in, for example, personnel management, training and infrastructure issues.

At the time of their respective wars, both the U.S. and Georgian Armies were also missing strategies to combat resistance to change. Every large organization inherently resists change. Georgia and the U.S. Army had to take on this challenge at the end of their respective wars. Both armies lacked a “Plan-the-(Transformation)-Plan” and “Find the Champion Change Management Strategy”. General William Eugene DePuy was the Commander of the newly created TRADOC and had the overall responsibility of defining necessary reforms transforming Army training throughout the force. To identify and manage the change, DePuy used an effective approach.

General DePuy used a small, trusted team in which all activities were on “close-hold”. None of the results of the work was publicized or allowed to be disseminated without permission. The team of expert planners developed DePuy’s Change Management Strategy starting with a detailed mission analysis through an orderly and honest appraisal of the problems. Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].

General DePuy incorporated the “Champion Concept” into his plans, in which a very senior officer with influence within the military, and amenable to reform, was identified and assigned the role of senior advocate. As various obstacles to reform were identified, the “Champion” informed other senior reform supporters about the logic driving the plans, and actively solicited their support of that plan. Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].

The post-war Georgian leadership incorporated the Champion Concept, though not identified by name as such, more often than ever before. They also recognized the dire need to continue to evolve in their planning and change management strategies. The Georgians also focused intensely on training, education, and individual and organizational competence.

Westmoreland put reforms in place which included:

- “...decentralizing training and making improvements in training techniques; putting into place the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS); centralizing enlisted assignments and promotions at the grade of E-5 (Sergeant) and above; making minor improvements
to the Officer Education System (OES); and, most importantly, establishing the Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 38)

The GAF also intensified its efforts in these areas. It wrote applicable guiding documents, stood up a Simulations Training Center and enhanced their TRADOC in Training, Professional Military Education (PME) and Doctrine. In PME it began a Command and General Staff College (CGSC).4

Both militaries were hindered by a lack of a whole of government or unified interagency approach and both took steps to ameliorate this issue through supporting doctrine and buy-in at the highest levels of government.

A well-developed joint inter-agency operations capability is critical for effectively waging counter-insurgency warfare, well versed in asymmetric and guerrilla warfare or in high-technology postmodern warfare (Pallin & Westerlund, 2009).

At the time of the 2008 War, as a military advisor in Georgia, I did not observe interagency interest in participation, planning or training. Therefore, aside from anecdotal evidence, Georgia did not develop, or integrate interagency aspects into their exercises, planning or training. Again, there was no command and general staff college educating and developing GAF officers, and interagency representatives regarding full spectrum joint, interagency and multinational operations.

In research from Mangum (2020), The major national and international event in modern Georgian history tested the viability of civil-military relations in Georgia as well as the mettle of the Georgian Armed Forces, and both were found wanting. As mentioned above, “retreating Georgian forces left tens of thousands of civilians behind who faced retribution at the hands of South Ossetian militias” (Watson, 2008). No coordinated plan was in place to address this contingency including critical interagency aspects. Today, U.S. and Georgian education and exercises address the interagency aspect of operations.

Following their respective wars, both countries began an equipment enhancement program. Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Williams Abrams Jr., “focused Army modernization on the “Big Five” weapon systems. The “Big Five” were the M1 Abrams Tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache Helicopter, the Blackhawk Helicopter, and the Patriot Air Defense Missile. In an era of very constrained resources, this is perhaps best understood as an effort to focus limited research and development dollars on key systems. When resources became available in the 1980s, these programs then provided the focus for expanded procurement” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 40).

While Georgia made major equipment upgrade investments also, in communications, radars, anti-tank and air-defense systems (Axe, 2020).

The GAF focused on their equipment modernization program discerning capabilities, force structure, cost, training, mission support and sustainment. This focus included Cyber Operations.

Cyber did not exist during the Vietnam War however, Information Operations did. So post-Vietnam, it is fair to say that the U.S. had to develop its Cyber capabilities and continue to enhance its information operations. The U.S. lost the messaging war in Information Operations through the atrocities committed by U.S. troops and the practice of burning villages. Georgians had nascent cyber capabilities but could not execute effectively.

Accordingly, both post-war armies had to develop their most effective cyberspace tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Neither Army at this time had an effective, efficient organization for defining, developing and refining doctrine such as a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Georgia had Training and Military Education Command (TMEC), as their version of TRADOC, but the ‘D’ for doctrine was conspicuously missing along with many other TRADOC functions present in form and not substance.

Missing a functional TRADOC, both armies lacked the institutional means to conceptualize and implement meaningful concepts and policies. This included operational and management concepts needed for efficient mission planning and control.

To that point, in research from Gross and Phonexayphova (2019),

Rather than focusing on the purchase and deployment of weapons and equipment, the United States must also acknowledge that Georgia does not have “the doctrinal and institutional foundations of a modern military force.” Building a framework of a self-sufficient modern force requires tailored solutions
that do not ignore categorical problems in the nation’s defense capacity.

While in both armies, there were only nascent systems of doctrine development in place:

Military reform is about more than changing doctrine. To implement its doctrine, an organization must have appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organizations, equipment, and leader development programs. Therefore, attempts to implement a comprehensive reform agenda must be supported by critical analytical work which logically relates developments in each of these areas. (Nielson, 2010, pp. vii).

The U.S. Army was transitioning to the Airland Battle Doctrine and Georgia was in the midst of determining her doctrinal foundation.

Doctrine, in large part, covers how an army trains, fights and functions. Without it, one must ask how an army is training, fighting and functioning. Georgia was using doctrine from too many countries which complicated their doctrine development and force structure.

In the U.S. Army, the afore-mentioned DOTmLPF-P drove the creation of TRADOC and U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM).

Both post-war armies were struggling with the assignment of organizational responsibilities:

“The implementation of comprehensive change requires an organizational entity with broad authority able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms. In the case of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s, this organization was the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)” (Nielson, 2010, pp. vii).

In Georgia, the use of DOTmLPF-P drove the enhancement of a more functional Georgian TRADOC and Land Forces Command and helped identify and assign organizational responsibilities.

For the U.S., the creation of a functional TRADOC gave one command (and its four-star commander) unified responsibility for training, teaching, and developing the Army in terms of equipment, doctrine, and force structure” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 40).

Concurrently, United States Army Forces Command could focus on warfighting, while TRADOC was able to ensure that changes in personnel policies, organizations, doctrine, training practices, and equipment were integrated and mutually reinforcing. (Nielsen, 2010, p. vii)

As with Georgia’s continual enhancement of TMEC and Land Forces Command, the U.S. TRADOC and FORSCOM organizations served to enhance preparation, training and employment of forces. As stated, both Georgia and the U.S. needed new doctrine, and both moved ahead rapidly with this effort:

TRADOC also developed a new doctrine for battlefield action, published as Field Manual 100-5 Operations in 1976. The manual put a premium on realistic, intense combined arms training to enable the Army to win its “first battle of the next war” against numerically unfavorable odds (Chapman, 1993).

Accordingly, NATO or US training assistance had limited effect as Georgia was missing institutions with certain capabilities. Capabilities such as what Gross and Phonexayphova (2019) refer to as, “self-supporting training capacity to prepare and sustain resilient, capable tactical combat units for territorial defense.”

During their respective wars, both the U.S. and Georgian Armies lacked senior leadership emphasis on improvement and development of “prescribed policies, procedures and responsibilities for developing, managing and conducting training, education and leader development” (U.S. Army TRADOC, 2017, p.1); and the critical linkage to personnel management needed to support force readiness.

In other words, both armies were missing a key mechanism for institutionalization of military transformation concepts, efforts and products. Depuy fixed this by introducing Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, which required initiating action to improve and integrate all critical relevant defense activities. AR 350-1 (2017) “…prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for developing, managing, and conducting Army training and leader development” (p.1). Post-2008 war, the Georgians identified the need for their version of AR 350-1 and eventually created it.

Missing AR 350-1, both armies were therefore lacking the driving mechanism for development of subordinate policies and documents, which provide the “how to” in all the areas. Areas such as institutionalizing and standardizing policies and detailed methodology needed by American and Georgian soldiers
responsible in the development of instructional system curricula and evaluation. Accordingly, both armies were missing the driving instrument for directing a proper effective curricula development system, schooling and promotion sequence process in addition to the afore mentioned ‘legitimate’ doctrine development process.

As a result of these missing instruments in both the U.S. and Georgian Armies’ lessons learned and doctrine development were not stressed; and training was neither focused on the wartime mission nor was it standardized.

Additionally, both armies were more focused on training to time and not to standards. Planning calendars were in disarray and effective long-term planning was practically non-existent. Leader development and personnel management was lacking. In both armies, trainers would conduct effective and quality training, which had little residual effect, and provided little redundant capability, as training was not institutionalized (Examples: Training Management, Squad Lanes, MDMP5 Training, ISAF6).

So, AR 350-1 was a critical piece for fast and continuous improvement in individual and collective training, officer and NCO training and education, etc. and provided the “how to” in all the areas.

Accordingly, both Georgia and the U.S. only had a nascent National Training Center and integrated Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).

These changes cannot happen overnight. The process of developing and implementing peacetime military changes can take several decades. Therefore, stability in an organization’s mission and resources can be important (Nielsen, 2010, p. 4).

As a newly independent state, Georgia required “Defense modernization meeting mission requirements via a functional effective program in terms of effort and resources, leading to a blended effort of all required functional areas” Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview]. As an army in distress post-Vietnam, the U.S. Army needed the same.

Conclusion
So, one can see there are many parallels between the U.S. Army toward the end of the Vietnam War, and Georgia at the end of the 2008 Georgia-Russia War.

The U.S. Army made remarkable strides: It recovered from the Vietnam War, transitioned to an all-volunteer personnel model, and refocused on a potential future war against a very capable adversary in Europe (Nielsen, 2010, pp. viii).

Just as the U.S. made remarkable strides, Georgia made and continues to make remarkable strides in military transformation through visionary leadership, a warrior culture and no-shortage of intellectual capacity. In summation, well into the 1980s the United States was trying to rebuild its military from the devastating effects of the decade-long War in Vietnam. These things do not happen over-night. Georgia found itself in the same position and is making tremendous progress.

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