Transovrabia’s Path to Military Reform: Aspects of Defense Transformation

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Abstract
The Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991, and fifteen former Soviet Republics gained their independence. The megalithic Soviet military disintegrated from being a unified organization into a series of national militaries belonging to former USSR member countries. However, many of these countries lacked the proper framework, systems, and processes necessary to effectively operate newly independent, national armies.

Transovrabia is a surrogate name for a former Soviet country with her own culture, history, institutions, and ambitions. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, she suddenly found herself the master of her own destiny. The West committed to aiding in her transformation. My objective was to identify a better approach to transforming Transovrabia. In order to do this, I identified challenges faced by Transovrabia. I also reviewed the transformation methodology used by the U.S. Army in the 1970s and analyzed what might crosswalk to Transovrabia’s efforts in transformation today. Finally, I identified the weak or missing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), framework parameters and the impact of not having these parameters correctly applied to Transovrabia’s transformation.

After nearly two decades in Transovrabia, U.S., NATO and Transovrabian leadership correctly ask why military transformation is taking so long. This paper addresses the “why”.

By implementing the framework additions identified in this paper, both NATO and DSCA will provide a stronger foundation for Transovrabian countries in transformation. Based on experience, this framework will result in compressing transformation time by at least one decade.

Keywords: Security Cooperation, Military Transformation, NATO Clearing House, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Curriculum Development (ADDIE), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), National Training Center (NTC), Former Soviet Union, Soviet Army, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

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Introduction

Transovrabia

The Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991, and fifteen former Soviet republics\(^1\) of the USSR gained their independence. The megalithic Soviet military disintegrated from being a unified organization into a series of national militaries belonging to former USSR\(^2\) member countries. However, many of these countries lacked the proper framework, systems, and processes necessary to effectively operate newly independent, national armies.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Transovrabia suddenly found herself the master of her own destiny. Transovrabia is a surrogate name for a former Soviet country with her own culture, history, institutions, and ambitions. As such, she is illustrative of the immense challenges faced by all former Soviet and Warsaw Pact\(^3\) member states in recognizing, planning, and implementing necessary political, social, and organizational reforms and methodologies for the transformation of their legacy militaries into national organizations.

Of necessity, Transovrabia was forced to continue to subscribe to Soviet military doctrine, and the previous way of doing business. There were few other options, since the inherited legacy military, and its methodologies, reflected standard Soviet over-compartmentalization, over-classification, over-bureaucratization, and operational rigidity.

Moving forward, it is important to understand what we mean when we use the terms reform, innovate and transform. Reform means “to improve (someone or something) by removing or correcting faults, problems, etc” (merriam-webster.com, 2021). Innovation means “a new idea, device, or method” (merriam-webster.com, 2021). Transform means “to change in composition or structure” (merriam-webster.com, 2021). Change must be doctrine-based.

Doctrine is a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as a part of a joint force. It is a guide, not a set of fixed rules and provides a common frame of reference to solve military problems. It also forms the basis for training and support products. Doctrine focuses on ‘how’ to think – not ‘what’ to think thereby instilling creative thinking and initiative. (FM 3-0 Army Operations, 2008)

The challenge for Transovrabia today is to move from the old system of doctrine which informs of “What to think”, to a new system of doctrine which informs of “How to think”.

Military reform is about more than changing doctrine. To implement its doctrine, an organization must have appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organizations, equipment, and leader development programs. Therefore, attempts to implement a comprehensive reform agenda must be supported by critical analytical work which logically relates developments in each of these areas (Nielsen, 2010, pp. vii).

While any large organization inherently resists change, Transovrabia’s inherited legacy systems embodied resistance to change on steroids.

All militaries must strike a balance between varieties of imperatives. These include perceived security threats facing the nation, the state of the national economy, the available funding for training, operations and modernization, the available manpower, the state of operational and combat readiness, and the capabilities and limitations of the available technology. As a newly independent state,

\(^{1}\) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the three Baltic States, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

\(^{2}\) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Transovrabia required “…defense modernization meeting mission requirements via a functional effective program in terms of effort and resources, leading to a blended effort of all required functional areas.” Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].

To remain mission capable, and to be able to face future challenges, all militaries must continue to change and adapt. Such change occasionally requires a major paradigm shift. To respond to new national imperatives, Transovrabia needed to transform its legacy Soviet system from relying on rote memorization and implementation of rigid doctrinal tenets, to a more flexible mission-command system. This required comprehensive transformation of the full spectrum of military capability, including “doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership/education, personnel management, infrastructure/installations, as well as the full scope of national and organizational military policy” DOTmlPF-P⁴ (DAU, nd, p.1). In effect, Transovrabia needed elements of all of the DOTmlPF-P system.

We also find in Transovrabia a lack of senior leadership emphasis on improvement and development of “prescribed policies, procedures and responsibilities for developing, managing and conducting training, education and leader development” (U.S. Army TRADOC, 2017, p.1); and the critical linkage to personnel management. All of this should be designed to support force readiness.

Additionally, we find in Transovrabia, a lack of subordinate policies and documents, which provide the "how to" in all the areas. Illustrative of this would be the lack of institutionalizing and standardizing policies. Also lacking is detailed methodology needed by

Transovrian service members responsible in the development of instructional system curricula and evaluation.

As a result of these missing pieces, doctrine development and lessons learned are not stressed; and training is neither standardized nor focused on the unit’s wartime mission. Planning calendars are in disarray and effective long-term planning is virtually non-existent, while leader development and personnel management is lacking. Advisors conduct effective and quality training, which has little residual effect, and provides little redundant capability, as training is not institutionalized. (Examples include: Squad Lanes, ISAF⁵, Training Management, MDMP⁶ Training.) Instead of one standardized way of doing things, units and organizations do things many different ways. This is not only Transovrabia today; this was the U.S. Army in 1970.

Both the U.S. and NATO willingly assist Transovrabia in the implementation of necessary military reforms. The primary U.S. change agent is the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency DSCA.

“...the planning and implementation of the specific programs and policies that shape activities of large numbers of people toward a common functional purpose.” (Kier, as cited in Nielsen, 2010, p. 6). “At the core of this dynamic, “the process of developing, adjusting, but in most cases a significant change to ‘standard,’ they do not change quickly or easily.” (as cited in Nielsen, 2010, pp. 3).

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The DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), directs, administers, and provides (Department of Defense) DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions abroad for the execution of DoD security assistance and security cooperation programs over which DSCA has responsibility…” (Department of Defense, United States, 2012).

⁴ DOTmlPF-P stands for:
- Doctrine: the way we fight (e.g., emphasizing maneuver warfare, combined air-ground campaigns)
- Organization: how we organize to fight (e.g., divisions, air wings, Marine-Air Ground Task Forces)
- Training: how we prepare to fight tactically (basic training to advanced individual training, unit training, joint exercises, etc).
- Materiel: all the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces that DOES NOT require a new development effort (weapons, spares, test sets, etc that are “off the shelf” both commercially and within the government)
- Leadership and education: how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight (squad leader to 4-star general/admiral)
- Professional development
- Personnel: availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations

⁵ International Security Assistance Force.
NATO created the Clearing House for transformation to assist transitioning national militaries. This Clearing House system serves as a coordinating mechanism for NATO offering assistance to countries, as well as for countries requesting assistance from NATO.

The NATO Clearing House is a mechanism set up to “assess necessities and priorities and coordinate bilateral actions, avoiding overlaps” (Abazi, p. 25).

However, a fundamental problem of the Clearing House system is that it relies on the host country, in this case Transovrabia, to define what its objectives and needs are, in order to reform and transform its legacy military.

There is room for a nuanced improvement here. Given the legacy Soviet intellectual and operational methodologies inherited by the country, Transovrabia does not have the necessary framework to comprehensively and effectively identify or define what she needs. In effect, Transovrabia does not know what she does not know. Concurrently, the West usually offers a weak framework and shallow understanding of what makes transformation most effective, efficient, and timely in Transovrabia. Given this dynamic, “the process of developing, implementing, and institutionalizing complementary reforms can take several decades.” (Nielsen, 2010, p. vii). This is particularly true, when moving forward with a weak foundational framework. Naturally, we seek ways to be more effective. Thus, we should strive to assimilate observations, insights, and lessons and implement best practices.

Accordingly, the U.S. assembled a team of retired U.S. military experts tasked with assisting the Transovrabian military in the major effort of planning and implementing military reforms. The objective was to create a local military that was closer to, and more compatible with NATO forces.

What We Do and Do Not Know

The very complex and difficult effort to get organizational reform correct requires visionary leadership.

“Leaders within military organizations are essential; developments external to military organizations most often have an indeterminate impact. Political leaders’ interpretations of the international environment, and their decisions on issues such as the military budget and conscription, shape the parameters within which military leaders act. However, military leaders play an important role in determining how to manage these challenges and constraints and develop the specific programs and policies that shape military institutions in important ways” (Nielsen, 2010, pp. 3).

That said, the planning and implementation of change in all military organizations is inherently difficult, because changing the direction of large bureaucracies is inherently difficult, and the military, is in fact, a huge bureaucracy. For the military to be effective, standards, procedures and processes need to be standardized. Paradoxically however, as Allison and Zelikow (1999), found, “Since procedures are ‘standard,’ they do not change quickly or easily.” (as cited in Nielsen, 2010).

Planning and implementing meaningful institutional change, also include at least an adjustment, but in most cases a significant change to the culture of the organization. “The existence of a strong organizational culture, like the existence of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), can serve the functional purpose of helping to coordinate the activities of large numbers of people toward a common purpose.” (Kier, as cited in Nielsen, 2010, p. 6). “At the same time, minimizing uncertainty, usually a reasonable goal for organizational leaders, may also militate against change” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 8).
In Transovrabia’s case, the resistance to change is made even more complex by the fact that she inherited, rather than developed her own military. Accordingly, she lacks the institutional means to conceptualize, develop and implement meaningful military concepts and policies. Additionally, she often has no viable means of developing the doctrine, or operational and management concepts needed for effective mission planning and control. Transovrabia, in large part, continues to rely on legacy Soviet methodology for planning, training, and execution. In support of Transovrabia’s transformation, the West plays a role.

It is not enough to concentrate solely on the military aspects of transformation. It is also necessary that U.S. and/or NATO outsiders understand the complex cultural, historical, societal, political, intellectual, and institutional imperatives that constitute Transovrabia as a whole. Such understanding is needed to provide the basis for meaningful, detailed advice and assistance required for successful transformation of national military forces. Without such understanding, assistance provided to Transovrabia will result in a great many dead-ends, frustrations, and many additional months, and even years of effort.

The cultural aspect to change in Transovrabia is complex, and captured in part by the following paradigm.

“In the West, we do all but which the law expressly forbids. In most of Transovrabia, Transovrabian’s do only what the law expressly allows. This concept points even more to the immense difficulty of changing the culture and methodologies of thought.”


Naturally, the culture aspect should not be viewed in a negative light.

We should be careful with negative stereotyping of cultures and accept their differences; moreover, we have to be aware of differences within a culture, and of personal peculiarities and preferences. (Shioshvili, 2017).

While one of several possible methodologies, an overview of how the U.S. Army managed to conduct a step-by-step transformation after the war in Vietnam is illustrative. This is true, particularly concerning the scope, complexities, interconnectivities and very significant challenges of transforming the Transovrian military.

U.S. Army in Transition

Following the Vietnam War, an imperative developed among U.S. Army leaders in the mid-1970s to ‘save’ an Army that was recognized to be in crisis. (Nielsen, 2010, p. 42). The lessons learned from Vietnam drove the need to study, evaluate, and redefine management policies and methodologies of the Army, and especially leader development programs and training and personnel management systems. A concurrent effort was needed to look at the operational organization, capabilities, weaponry, and equipment of the service.

The need for review and renewal was also driven by the significant transition from a conscription-based military to an all-volunteer force. Soldiers, who want to be in the military voluntarily, tend to have a completely different outlook about military service, than those who are forced by the state to serve. A professional force also introduces a whole new spectrum of personnel and training requirements, not least by staying longer. This creates a force of somewhat older military members with families requiring the allocation of additional support. Professional soldiers also require considerably more sophisticated training, equipment, and other resources.

The resulting comprehensive transformation of the U.S. Army was accompanied and accomplished by the afore-mentioned visionary leadership, and of course a massive amount of planning and work. This
transformation resulted in a serial transition from the so-called Active Defense Doctrine of the 1970s, to the Air-Land Battle doctrine of the 1980’s and 90’s. This transitional continuum bore fruit in the overwhelming success achieved by the U.S. military and its allies in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. So, how was this achieved?

General William Childs Westmoreland was the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) 1968 to 1972. The focus of Westmoreland’s reforms was what he termed “professionalism,” which he said involved “training, education, and individual and organizational competence” (Westmoreland, 1977, as cited in Nielson, 2010).

“Reforms included: decentralizing training and making improvements in training techniques; putting into place the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS); centralizing enlisted assignments and promotions at the grade of E-5 (Sergeant) and above; making minor improvements to the Officer Education System (OES); and, most importantly, establishing the Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES)” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 38).

An added complication, as with all large organizations, was that the Army was resistant to change, and means had to be found to overcome complacency and systemic inertia. However, the Army was fortunate in the visionary leadership of a succeeding CSA 1972 - 1974, General Creighton Williams Abrams Jr.

Abrams focused Army modernization on the “Big Five” weapon systems. The “Big Five” were the M1 Abrams Tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache Helicopter, the Blackhawk Helicopter, and the Patriot Air Defense Missile. In an era of very constrained resources, this is perhaps best understood as an effort to focus limited research and development dollars on key systems. When resources became available in the 1980s, these programs then provided the focus for expanded procurement. (Nielsen, 2010, p. 40).

In addition to modernizing weapons systems, the U.S. Army also needed to delineate and designate specific, assigned, organizational and functional responsibilities to implement the necessary transformational changes. Branch rivalries had to be dealt with, and any overlapping responsibilities adjudicated.

With this goal in mind, the Army developed and defined DOTmLPF-P, which became the fundamental formula and structure driving Army reform. It also drove the creation of a number of essential organizations to assist that transformation and improve the capabilities of the U.S. Army into the future.

The creation of both TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command), and FORSCOM (U.S. Forces Command) in 1973, defined and delineated specific responsibilities of each organization, to enhance and improve training, preparation, and employment of U.S. Army forces. They worked in a complimentary fashion to improve the entire U.S. Army.

“The implementation of comprehensive change requires an organizational entity with broad authority able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms. In the case of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s, this organization was the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).” (Nielsen, 2010, pp. vii).

The creation of TRADOC gave one command (and its four-star commander) unified responsibility for training, teaching, and developing the Army in terms of equipment, doctrine, and force structure” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 40).

Concurrently, United States Army Forces Command could focus on warfighting, while TRADOC was able to ensure that changes in personnel policies, organizations, doctrine, training practices, and equipment were integrated and mutually reinforcing.
(Nielsen, 2010, p. vii) This was a critically important aspect of the ongoing reform and transformation process.

As Commander of the newly created TRADOC, General William Eugene DePuy had the immensely important overall responsibility of defining necessary reforms transforming Army training throughout the force.

Change had to be identified and managed. To do so, DePuy used an effective approach I will briefly outline.

General DePuy used a small, trusted team in which all activities were on “close-hold”. None of the results of the work was publicized or allowed to be disseminated without permission. The team of expert planners developed DePuy’s Change Management Strategy starting with a detailed mission analysis through an orderly and honest appraisal of the problems. Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].

This included identification and detailed review of the negative effects of the war in Vietnam on the U.S. Army as an institution. It also included a review of the effects of the then ongoing buildup of forces by the Soviet Union, the elimination of conscription, and the transformation of the U.S. military into an all-volunteer force. Also included were the myriad impacts of both budget and Army organization issues. Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].

The team considered and planned all required outside coordination, including methods to overcome all anticipated obstacles. The team also considered and incorporated into planning, the possibility that there would be opposition to the reform plans within the Army. DePuy’s team identified anticipated “resisters” to change throughout the Army leadership and worked to counter the anticipated reasoning for such resistance.

The planning phase also included the development of the necessary organizational structure needed for plan implementation. Significantly, “DePuy directed his staff not to base the reform plan on a defined structure, but rather to base the revised organizational structure on the reform plan.” Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].

The team used a similar approach for the internal development and processes of TRADOC regarding the afore-mentioned responsibilities. This many-faceted review resulted in the drafting of a comprehensive reform concept, including issues related to leader development, operational and support capabilities, training and education, personnel management, warfighting and other doctrine, equipment modernization, and so forth.

Consequently, “DePuy directed his staff not to base the reform plan on a defined structure, but rather to base the revised organizational structure on the reform plan.” Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].

Once reform plans were finalized, they had to be presented and indeed “sold” to all of the various stakeholders throughout the
Army. Due to the inherent resistance to change present in the Army, obtaining ‘buy-in’ proved difficult. Various senior leaders and organizations actively resisted the proposed changes. After a year and a half of effort, DePuy saw negligible results from going through the traditional Army working group approach. Accordingly, the CSA directed General DePuy to continue his efforts “off-line”, by going around the headquarters bureaucracy directly to the major commanders. Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].

CONCEPT CHART ON US ARMY REFORM EFFORT – 1970s

Negligible results above, led to the approach below. Reform took an extended period of time. The U.S. had to establish clear priorities based on the mission analysis and stick to the plan, except for those changes that were absolutely required. They would then repeat the process below for each major functional area. If sufficient resources were available, these planning activities were ongoing simultaneously.

General DePuy also incorporated the “Champion Concept” into his plans, in which a very senior officer with influence within the military, and amenable to reform, was identified and assigned the role of senior advocate. The role of such advocacy was to push for the incorporation and implementation of reform concepts at the highest leadership levels. During the development of plans to transform the U.S. Army, we used a Champion approach. As various obstacles to reform were identified, the “Champion” informed other senior reform supporters about the logic driving the plans, and actively solicited their support of that plan. Brown, W. (2014, July 29). [Personal interview].


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<th>STEP 1</th>
<th>US ARMY Mission Analysis</th>
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<th>STEP 2</th>
<th>PLAN / DEVELOP THE REFORM CONCEPT</th>
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<td>Develop a comprehensive concept/plan to addresses all functional areas – e.g., – Personnel, Leader Development, Training/Education, Doctrine, Equipment, Operational/Support Capabilities, - etc. required to support the US Army Mission.</td>
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<th>ULTIMATE GOAL:</th>
<th>US Army reform meeting mission requirements via a functional; effective program in terms of resources, time and money leading to a coherent, integrated effort of all required functional areas.</th>
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| STEP 3 | Present/coordinate the reform plan to all “stakeholders” as if they were a part of the development of an evolving reform plan based on a published general concept. Make necessary acceptable changes to the plan. |

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<th>STEP 4</th>
<th>Finalize the Reform Plan and gain approval.</th>
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| STEP 5 | Provide rigorous/consistent supervision of the entire execution of the reform plan. |

= US ARMY REFORM TO MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS
This institutionalization mechanism was accomplished in the U.S. transformation effort via the implementation of AR 350-1. This regulation required initiating action to improve and integrate all critical relevant defense activities. AR 350-1 (2017) “…prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for developing, managing, and conducting Army training and leader development” (p.1). It will, in turn, direct Transovabia’s Armed Forces to use a proper curricula development system, schooling and promotion sequence process, and a ‘legitimate’ doctrine development process.

Below is another illustration in short indicating why 350-1 was the missing link and key to U.S. military reform:
AR 350-1 set the stage for needed supporting regulatory documents. It was a critical document for rapid and sustained improvement in training (individual and collective), training management, leader development, officer training and education, NCO training and education, initial entry training etc. 350-1 establishes requirements for policies; improves the current policies, procedures, and responsibilities; and provides general guidance for subordinate policies and documents that provides the "how to" in all the areas. Here are only a few examples under each category:

**Developing, managing, and conducting doctrine development.**
(Example of sample subordinate policies)
- Doctrine and Tactics Training Policy
- Intelligence & Security Training Policy
- Opposing Force (OPFOR) Training Policy

**Developing, managing, and conducting Training.**
(Example of sample subordinate policies)
- Training Management Policy
- Physical Fitness Training Policy
- Sustainment Training Policy
- Training Devices Policy

**Developing, managing, and conducting leader development.**
(Example of sample subordinate policies)
- Military Civilian Training & Transovrabian Military Civilian Policy
- New Equipment Training Policy

Leadership Assessment Policy
Officer Professional Development Policy
NCO Professional Development Policy

Management & Operation Of Training Support Centers Policy

Establishing a properly structured supporting organization.
(Example of sample subordinate policies)
- Foreign Training Programs Policy
- National Guard and Army Reserve Career Development Policy
- Combat Training Center Policy

Developing, managing, and conducting education development.
(Example of sample subordinate policies)
- Education Process Policy
- Training & Leader Development Policy

The basic methodology used by General DePuy’s planning team is shown in the following chart:

Reform did not neglect doctrine.

TRADOC also developed a new doctrine for battlefield action, published as Field Manual 100-5 Operations in 1976. The manual put a premium on realistic, intense combined arms training to enable the Army to win its “first battle of the next war” against numerically unfavorable odds. It became a fundamentally important document and had an impact on how the U.S. Army conducted warfighting for many years (Chapman, 1993).
In 1982, the U.S. Army was also transitioning to the newly formulated Air Land Battle Doctrine. This doctrine attempted to synchronize and better integrate the increasingly more mobile large-scale warfighting functions with the rotary-air capability, first demonstrated on an immense scale in the Vietnam conflict.

At that time, the U.S. had only a nascent National Training Center and lacked a comprehensive, integrated Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). There was neither a central organization for defining and refining doctrine, nor a system to standardize, implement, and inculcate a comprehensive, complimentary system of training and force employment.

About the same time, General Bernard William Rogers was appointed to create the National Training Center (NTC), which opened in 1981 at Fort Erwin, California. This 7,053 square mile\(^7\) base was designed to support live-fire, brigade-level, force-on-force exercises. This proved to be invaluable in improving the combat capabilities and readiness of all U.S. Army units.

**U.S. Support for Transovrabian Military Transformation**

The fundamental framework NATO and DSCA offer Transovrabia must address the critical issue of institutionalization. Based on experience, not doing so will add at least a decade to Transovrabia’s transformation. From the threat assessment process, to doctrine and curricula development, to training and equipping, everything must be institutionalized, or the transformation effort will flounder as soon as your Western transformation team leaves Transovrabia. As mentioned, this institutionalization issue was accomplished in the U.S. transformation effort via the implementation of AR 350-1.

The fundamental framework NATO and DSCA offer Transovrabia must address the critical issue of policy. The concept of “policy” in the West refers to a powerful set of rules and procedures aimed at the implementation of specific objectives. It is an implementation tool made by organizations to achieve their aims and goals (Bushyhead, 2021). It is also a missing link in Transovrabia’s effort to transform. Lack of a functional policy mechanism hinders institutionalization and delays transformation.

Accordingly, the West’s policy approach is often replaced in Transovrabia with concepts, strategies, laws or regulations; concepts or strategies, which lack enforcement impact, or laws or regulations which are often too rigid and hard to change (Bushyhead, 2021). The West usually confuses the West’s version of “Policy” with Transovrabia’s “Politika”. In most cases, Transovrabia’s “Politika” represents a political posture, rather than the way an organization is run. Additionally, establishing SOPs in Transovrabia, seemingly a simple task is quite difficult to do, as Transovrabian’s often conflate SOPs with orders. The difference, usage and impact should be clarified in the framework. We should not underestimate the impeding effect of this nuance. After all, we are all shooting for timely and effective transformation.

The U.S. TRADOC/FORSCOM “Plan-the-Plan and Find the Champion” approach worked in the U.S. to both define and initiate comprehensive military reforms. Assigned in the scope of Defense Security Cooperation in 2003 to support Transovrabian military reform, our U.S. team was missing key framework parameters.

Years later, still in Transovrabia, after getting the approval of our parent organization, our U.S. team applied the “Plan-the-Plan and Find the Champion” approach. We did this in concert with the Transovrabians, to write and implement a Transovrabian version of AR 350-1 Training and

\(^7\) 18.267 km\(^2\).
Leader Development. After that success, we used the approach again.

Our team urged Transovrabia to develop and implement a new Military Education Policy. Any such policy also required the development of a new curriculum for military education. Thus, our team formulated a Curriculum Development Process (ADDIE) Course to assist in implementation of the Military Educational Policy.

Then, taking a cue from Gen DePuy, our team identified a “Champion” within Transovrabia’s military leadership, through whom permission was obtained to implement the Curriculum Developmental Course. The Champion also directed local military educators and instructors to attend the newly developed course. This was done to develop “buy-in” by those who would ultimately implement that process, and the new Military Education Policy throughout the force. Accordingly, all instructors in Transovrabia, at every level, are required to attend the Curriculum Development Course.

AR 350-1 (2014) directed that the ADDIE process must be used by all commands and agencies. In short, ADDIE steps are as follows:

- **Analysis.** The analysis phase is the link between identifying the educational requirements and developing the instruction. In this phase, determine what must be taught and how the content can be taught effectively with the available resources.

- **Design.** The design phase uses the results of the analysis phase to help identify the lesson components. Topic lists are translated into major topics, which become terminal learning objectives (TLOs) and minor topics, which become enabling learning objectives (ELOs).

- **Development.** In this phase, the ELO standards, and lesson content outline are converted into an actual lesson plan and advance sheet to support learning outcomes.

- **Implementation.** This phase emphasizes the planning components required to teach the course. It has three distinct components. Component one ensures instructors/facilitators understand the course vision, content, and delivery methodology, and are ready to teach. Component two is the actual conduct of the course. Component three is to review the assessment of the students.

- **Evaluation.** Although depicted last in the ADDIE process, this is actually a continuous process that consists of data collection and analysis to determine the effectiveness and value of a course or program (TR 2017 pp. 47-53).
This ADDIE process can clearly apply as a project management approach to other projects, aside from education or curricula.

The process ensures a systematic approach to making individual and unit training decisions. Whether or not training and/or education is needed; the content and level along the career continuum; how, when, and where the training and education will be conducted; and the resources required to produce, distribute, implement, and evaluate the training and education (DA, 1994).

Brown was one of DePuy’s then captains, who went into U.S. Army schools to implement Instructional Systems Design (ISD).

I don’t think anybody has any idea in the giant leap in the impact we had. DePuy selected mostly captains, and some majors to attend the new ISD, ADDIE course at Florida State University (FSU) in 1972. Doctor Branson implemented ISD out of FSU. We called it, the “Transition Plan”. It was “Plan-the-Plan and Find the Champion” then go back to the school to implement.

I briefed General Officers who thought I was insane, because they wanted to make all the decisions. But General DePuy was ruthless and I was one of his men in the Infantry School implementing things. As a captain, I had colonels walk out on me, because they didn’t want to comply when the “Champion” told them to attend. Some got fired; many simply did not understand what we were trying to do in implementing ISD. ISD made the basis for training and implementing training easier, as it was standardized.

I always likened the first group of captains DePuy sent to the ISD course as a bunch of little rebels. With DePuy pressing from the top, and me and the other captains pushing from the bottom; it happened pretty quickly. You get a Champion, and then you have to grow a group of his disciples. This approach is how we worked. Our rebels grew in numbers and rank, and things got implemented. After DePuy’s pressure, they still viewed us crazy, but then tried at least to learn from us. The ISD and the transition process, “Plan-the-Plan and Find the Champion”, served me very well in life. It made me understand how to get things done better. Brown, W. (2014, July 29). Personal interview [Personal interview].

Brown lived the U.S. Army transition as a captain and subsequent ranks, but also witnessed the resulting changes in the U.S. Army as a result of the implementation of AR 350-1.

**Once implemented, AR 350-1 resulted in the following U.S. Army changes:**

- Major revision of individual and collective training, professional military education (PME), and personnel management;
- Moved from hours-based to a performance-based approach: “Train to Standard”;
- Tested individual soldiers, which measured ability of soldiers and NCOs’ ability to do his job;
- Measured army unit’s ability to perform tasks/missions based on performance to a standard;
- Redesign of army schools and PME. For example, the U.S. Army had several schools in different locations teaching the same Officer Basic Course. However, Brigade
Commander’s in the field in Vietnam complained that service members who graduated from the same course in different locations did not graduate with the same skill set. In other words, curriculum standardization did not exist. AR 350-1 addressed this problem in that it directed or mandated the development of the Education Process Policy, which standardizes curriculum development and ensures correct training in curriculum, regardless of location. Brown, W. (2014, July 29). Personal interview [Personal interview].

Additionally, we should consider the aspect of patriotism regarding some of the Transovrabia countries:

Foreign assistance is a voluntary gift from the United States, and the only real leverage for the U.S. is to stop giving the aid and walk away. How is it that after twenty years of training and equipping the Afghan military, most provincial capitals and the national capital fell to the Taliban in a few days and without even battle contesting the onslaught? I have trained foreign armies and to me the answer is clear – a lack of patriotism among the military. I the U.S. we are used to young men and women enlisting in our military services because they feel a patriotic obligation to the nation, even though it offers mortal danger and little economic incentive for service. That is because of patriotism. Mangum, W. (2021, November 5). [Personal interview].

One must assess how much this parameter plays a role in each Transovrabian country as it impacts the desired end state.

What Doctrine for Transovrabia?
Transovrabia usually lacks a coherent and balanced warfighting doctrinal strategy in her expression of the fundamental approach to fighting. “In order to have effective doctrine, militaries must have a doctrine development system in place. This is needed to capture emerging, evolving doctrine, needed for effective training and operations” (Bushyhead, 2021). If we cannot develop the doctrine we are contemplating, we have a roadblock to our desired end state.

Just as threats to a nation’s existence will continually change, doctrine used by that nation to defend and ensure her existence must continually morph to address those threats. To be effective and taken seriously by friend and foe alike, armies must be doctrine based.

U.S. Army transformation placed an, “…emphasis on using military doctrine to drive change in Army force development and operations and a strong focus on performance-oriented individual and unit training” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 44).

Transovrabia requires a strategic approach to defining Transovrabian country-specific doctrine. To have effective doctrine, Transovrabian leadership must define her doctrinal end state such that it addresses threats to Transovrabia’s existence. It must identify how Transovrabia will fight conventionally and unconventionally, including sequencing, such that she can dictate the fight. Doctrine cannot be comprehensively addressed until Transovrabia conducts a proper Threat Assessment. Accordingly, the origin of doctrine is the nation’s Threat Assessment which drives the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS in turn, drives the National Military Strategy (NMS), which in turn determines Transovrabia’s military mission. The military mission will help determine Transovrabia’s military doctrine. If this process is not used, doctrine, and therefore, PME will gallop off in the wrong direction.
Transovrabia’s Threat Assessment will consider her operational environment. Transovrabia’s goal should be to determine what she is realistically capable of doing with the correct doctrine based on analysis of her operational environment via the PMESII-PT\(^8\) and ASCOPE\(^9\) methodologies.

Transovrabia must discern, given her operational environment, what type of force she should be able to defeat; regular, irregular, criminal or combination hybrid.

While Transovrabia has a weak doctrine system, there is no shortage of intellectual capital to enable her to win, once these issues are addressed. She must establish and maintain her doctrine base, use capstone combat training programs, training doctrine and methodology and institutional schooling.

Accordingly, for these reasons, and as a keystone of reform, doctrine development cannot be left out of Transovrabia’s TRADOC. There is a “D” in the TRADOC ‘concept’ for a reason. A TRADOC in form, sans substance, is not a TRADOC, and the West’s framework must address this. A half-step approach sans a Champion prolongs everything and Transovrabia most often lacks a ‘Champion’ to resolve doctrine issues. This results in a lack of direction and a shortfall in education and training, further adversely affecting each warfighting function.

Herbert quoting Starry (1988, as cited in Nielson, 2010) found, 

Especially important was the link between doctrine and unit training, forged by the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The renewed emphasis on meaningful and challenging unit training was also evident in the development of combat training centers, in which units could test their skills in realistic settings against skilled opposing forces. (Nielsen, 2010, p. 44)

As an infantry officer, I used the ARTEP, Mission Training Plan (MTP), to effectively plan, execute, and assess training. I called it, “bang for the buck” training, as there was little time, relative to what

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\(^8\) Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure, Physical Environment and Time.

\(^9\) Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events.
was needed to train on mission related tasks and subtasks. Through ARTEP MTPs, commanders can laser-focus on the most critical training tasks relative to the mission. The payback in unit mission preparedness is priceless. It is also focused on the unit’s wartime mission.

“Training Validity is the most important part of the analysis. So, we wanted to provide a procedure to establish training validity. In other words, train on what ought to be trained.” (ATDCFL, 2020, 8:16).

Doctrine in PME is equally as important as Doctrine in training. Transovrabia cannot address PME until it addresses doctrine. Transovrabia needs, not just the correct doctrine, but the competent development of that doctrine, which goes into curricula.

Transovrabia, early on, must determine what country-source doctrine she will rely on for her foundation. If it is multi-country, the issue of doctrine and training, equipping etc. becomes exponentially more complex. Already resource constrained, now she needs subject matter experts (SMEs) and translators for each source-doctrine country; not to mention maintenance, parts, equipment and training. I was in the room in 2009 when Transovrabian leadership made the decision to base their source-country doctrine on U.S. doctrine. This did not mean copy-paste but rather Transovrabian foundational doctrine would be based on the relative U.S. source, then Transovrabianized and made NATO STANAG\textsuperscript{10} compliant.

Translators and SMEs are points of failure in doctrine development. As we know from experience, a copy-paste of U.S. or allied doctrine won’t work in Transovrabia. The doctrine must be Transovrabianized, and only Transovrabians can conduct this step with her SMEs. Accordingly, SMEs should be graduates of western schools who are trained to think analytically. They will usually better understand the concepts of mission command, commander’s intent and other nuances of U.S. or allied doctrine, as opposed to the Soviet system thinker who is trained rote-memory. These SMEs are spread thin as they are in demand across the Transovrabian force; usually in key leader and key staff positions, not prioritized to doctrine development. Suffice to say, Transovrabia does not always prioritize her doctrine and PME effort.

Translators are seldom equal; technical terms are an issue, as you may end up with “Fields of Fire” translated as “Burning Wheat Fields”. Additionally, translators cost money and are in high demand in Transovrabia. Competent and proficient translators, not properly compensated, will leave Transovrabia’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) to work for NGOs\textsuperscript{11} and civilian companies; thereby undermining the doctrine effort. Accordingly, translator competency and compensation should be addressed in the framework. Mismanagement of this issue can add a decade to Transovrabia’s transformation effort while other priorities, pressures and constraints on resources will drive Transovrabian leaders to allow it.

Transovrabia’s doctrine must address reserve forces and interagency integration in peace and war. Additionally, she should address advantages she can gain through technology - including simulations, computers, leveraging allies’ capabilities, and laser-integrated training assistance, National Training Centers and other force multipliers. Again, she must have a general officer Champion of doctrine development to make all of this happen.

\textsuperscript{10} Standardization Agreement (STANAG); NATO standardization document.

\textsuperscript{11} Non-Governmental Organization.
Transovrabia should probably not be allocating doctrine resources for doctrine such as space-based operations, when she hasn’t mastered the tactical or operational levels of war and lack that functional doctrine, not to mention capabilities.

If necessary, other doctrinal issues, such as intelligence collection capability and space-based operations can be RFI’d12 higher to allies. In this scenario, Transovrabia acts as an information source to feed higher. In turn, Transovrabia receives intelligence feedback and space-based capabilities support. Examples of this are imagery intelligence and to feed higher. In turn, Transovrabia receives. I reiterate there is no copy-paste transformation for all Transovrabian countries. There is, however, room for an improved copy-paste framework for structuring that transformation, a framework which currently has transformation delay-enabling factors built-in.

Training and Education Policy Based on 350-1. The key missing link to reform is a Transovrabian version of AR 350-1. AR 350-1 sets the stage for needed supporting regulatory documents. It is a critical document for rapid and sustained improvement in training (individual and collective), training management, leader development, officer training and education, NCO training and education, initial entry training etc. AR 350-1 also drives the requirement for a MEL 413 PME. Transovrabia lacking a Command and General Staff Course, results in catastrophic failure at the operational level in war. Unfortunately, we learned this from experience; and a few exchange student graduates do not suffice.

Institutionalization Mechanism. The West’s framework for Transovrabia must include the mechanisms built in for institutionalization of the transformation. Otherwise, the transformation effort collapses as soon as the West’s advisors depart. This institutionalization mechanism will also be captured in the Transovrabian version of the AR 350-1. It requires initiating action to improve and integrate all critical relevant defense activities. It will, in turn, direct Transovrabia’s Armed Forces to use a proper curricula development system, schooling and promotion sequence process and even doctrine development process.

Policy Mechanism. The Policy issue must be addressed in the West’s framework for Transovrabia. In most of Transovrabia, the Western

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12 Request for Information.

13 Military Education Level 4 (MEL4)
concept of Policy does not exist as a powerful rules implementation tool created by organizations to achieve their aims and goals (Bushyhead, 2021). Lack of a functional policy mechanism hinders institutionalization and delays transformation. Usually in Transovrabia, their version of Policy is “Politika”, which refers to a political document. Accordingly, the West’s policy approach is often replaced in Transovrabia with concepts or strategies, which lack enforcement impact, or laws or regulations which are too rigid and hard to change (Bushyhead, 2021). If this policy mechanism is not addressed, the institutionalism mechanism will remain dysfunctional or won’t take effect. Additionally, establishing Standard Operating Procedures in Transovrabia, seemingly a simple task is quite difficult to do, as Transovrabian’s conflate SOPs with orders. The difference, usage and impact should be clarified in the framework.

**TRADOC in Form Only.** The West’s framework for Transovrabia must include the standing up of ‘legitimate’ Transovrabian versions of TRADOC and FORSCOM. The creation of Transovrabian versions of TRADOC and FORSCOM should define and delineate specific responsibilities of each organization, to enhance and improve training, preparation, and the employment of Transovrabian Military Forces. By ‘legitimate’, I mean a TRADOC which performs the correct functions (resource limited, naturally) of a TRADOC. It does not mean, for example, a TRADOC without a legitimate, functional, prioritized doctrine development system for the first 15-years of the West’s effort in transformation and reform. The West may work hard to achieve this but it takes Transovrabian buy-in to get it done. The framework must address points of failure and delay in Doctrine development addressed in this paper.

**National Training Center.** The West’s framework for Transovrabia must include a legitimate National Training Center. If Transovrabia lacks the resources to do so, then perhaps the answer is regional. The West does Transovrabia no favors by accepting a NTC as legitimate, which trains only platoon or even company level, when Transovrabia’s brigades and battalions are facing, in many cases, the Russian Army, or other significant threats. Tactically they will probably do well. We are setting them up for catastrophic failure at the operational level. If resources and funds are available, the goal would be a fully instrumented NTC with an integrated Simulations Center.

**Interagency Coordination.** The West’s framework for Transovrabia must include a baked-in interagency coordination mechanism. This must include, school exchanges, and planning and coordination meetings directed both ways. This must also be doggedly driven by the Champion. Transovrabia’s priority doctrine should include a Transovrabian version of interagency coordination and cooperation similar to JP 3-08 Interagency Cooperation and FM 34-1 Intelligence Chapter 5 Joint, Combined, and Interagency Operations.

**Organizational Structure.** The framework planning phase should also include the development of the necessary organizational structure needed for plan implementation. The West’s framework guidance should not base the reform plan on a defined structure, but should rather base the revised organizational structure on the reform plan.

**Plan-the-Plan and Find the Champion Change Management Strategy.** This framework must also include a country-specific “Plan-the-Plan and Find the Champion” Change Management Strategy, managed by a Champion, or Champions from the Transovrabian leadership. This Champion is critical as Transovrabia still struggles with resistance to change and the concepts of commander’s intent and mission command. The Champion is needed in order to negotiate the expressly authoritarian, stove-piped and top-down-driven legacy system, or at least to work within it to get things done. The Champion will eliminate
resistance to change and drive all desired transformation. The framework must also address the potential change of Champion in mid-stream of the effort through, for example, reassignment or retirement. This is a point of failure as the incoming replacement may not have the same priorities. It may take several months to get him onboard, and, sans framework clarity, he may never get on board. The staff stops paying attention because the boss or Champion has other priorities. Transovrabian general officers do not work for NATO or the U.S. – so bake this parameter into the framework. It will also help the Champion to avoid internal political pressures regarding priorities.

**Blue Ribbon Panel.** Built into the framework should be a regular meeting of a Blue Ribbon Panel to identify obstacles to reform.

After nearly two decades in Transovrabia, U.S., NATO and Transovrabian leadership correctly ask why military transformation is taking so long. This paper addressed the “why”. Lacking the above listed framework parameters extends military transformation by at least a decade. While we can acknowledge, transformation is a long-term event, a weak framework prolongs the effort substantially. It is my opinion that many aspects of defense transformation in this paper will also apply to several countries in South and Central America.
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